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vConfronted with issues, whose (socioeconomic) 
causes cannot be resolved through the modification of 
the built environment, architectural interventions may 
often inadvertently aid the reproduction of the problems 
they seek to resolve. In eliminating symptoms of social 
inequality, alienation and marginalization, architecture 
can legitimize the social order out of which they arise. In 
such situations, architects’ attempts to concern themselves 
with narrowly practical concerns are insufficient even to 
their own aims, and in order to properly address the issues 
facing it, architecture must simultaneously operate as a 
vehicle for social critique and political emancipation. 
In the work of philosopher Slavoj Žižek, a critical-
emancipatory intervention corresponds to an emphasis of 
a constitutive tension and discord (“the gap”) within what 
is commonly perceived as a stable, neutral background. 
Critique strives not to explicitly reveal existing problems. 
Instead, it reveals an inherent inconsistency within an 
implicit, ideological fantasy of order and harmony that 
allows us to naturalize these problems. Consequently, the 
critical-emancipatory potential of architecture resides not 
in its programmatic content nor in its representational 
image, but in its capacity to disrupt the reassuring 
affective texture of ideology. Critique resides in a formally 
subtle (concerning architecture in its narrowest definition 
as an affective structure), yet politically radical shift 
in how problems of everyday life are interpreted and 
processed; re-introducing a minimal sense of disquietude 
that is both critical and emancipatory. The disquietude, 
that marks an absence of a fantasy of order and harmony, 
can, paradoxically, only be sustained as a product of a 
formally (representationally) ordered and harmonious 
appearance. The critical-emancipatory disquietude is 
not a compromise of the order and harmony, but rather 
a reflection of its uncompromisingly egalitarian nature.
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ForewordAt the beginning of his essay, “The Soul of Man 
Under Socialism”, Oscar Wilde describes the paradox of 
progressive-minded, well-intentioned interventions whose 
consequences ensure the reproduction of the problems 
they seek to remedy:
[People] find themselves surrounded by hideous pov-
erty, by hideous ugliness, by hideous starvation. It is 
inevitable that they should be strongly moved by all 
this. The emotions of man are stirred more quickly 
than man’s intelligence; and... it is much more easy 
to have sympathy with suffering than it is to have 
sympathy with thought. Accordingly, with admi-
rable, though misdirected intentions, they very seri-
ously and very sentimentally set themselves to the 
task of remedying the evils that they see. But their 
remedies do not cure the disease: they merely pro-
long it. Indeed, their remedies are part of the dis-
ease. They try to solve the problem of poverty, for in-
stance, by keeping the poor alive; or, in the case of a 
very advanced school, by amusing the poor. But this 
is not a solution: it is an aggravation of the difficulty. 
The proper aim is to try and reconstruct society on 
such a basis that poverty will be impossible. And the 
altruistic virtues have really prevented the carrying 
out of this aim. Just as the worst slave-owners were 
those who were kind to their slaves, and so prevented 
the horror of the system being realised by those who 
suffered from it, and understood by those who con-
templated it. ... Charity creates a multitude of sins.1
Confronted with social problems (and all problems of 
architecture are ultimately social) architects’ interventions 
are often akin to those of Oscar Wilde’s philanthropists. 
Through their genuine, otherwise admirable attempts to 
alleviate particular issues, the philanthropist-architects 
1. Quoted by Slavoj Žižek in Living in the 
End Times (London and New York: Verso, 
2008): 118.
xvi
simultaneously legitimize (and sustain) the political or 
economic order out of which these issues arose. Rendering 
its appearance more beautiful and pleasant seems to hide, 
rather than banish, the ugly and unpleasant features of 
our social reality. Consequently, progressively-minded 
architects often experience themselves as if trapped in 
a blackmail; torn between legitimizing the social order 
through ameliorative interventions of its symptoms, or 
withdrawing into a self-consciously ‘critical’ position 
- transgressing architecture’s normative social role and 
proposing to illustrate rather than ameliorate the issues 
at hand.
Philosopher Slavoj Žižek, proposes a possible 
escape route out of this deadlock. In opposing critique 
to transgression,  he suggests a manner of critique 
independent of a withdrawal from the social demands 
placed upon us. 
Namely, since the social order is (as Marx already 
noted) inherently inconsistent to itself (at its core there 
is always a gap), its self-perpetuation depends upon a 
phatasmatic, ideologic-libidinal supplement, which 
obscures its inconsistency (or, fills in the gap at its core). 
This phantasmatic background  allows us to derive 
minimal enjoyment from our interaction with social 
authority (or, conversely, feel guilty for not enjoying). 
A properly critical act, therefore, does not reside in 
explictly opposing social demands, but in disrupting the 
background fantasy of the social order’s inherent stability 
on its perpetuation depends.
Wilde’s critique of charity should, consequently, not 
be read as a (naive) advocacy of pseudo-revolutionary 
individualism - effective indifference to others’ suffering 
masked as a higher virtue, nor as blatant (liberalist) defense 
of virtues of self-interest. Charity, Wilde’s example, 
xvii
designates not only the act of giving - helping those in 
need, and, but also, more importantly, the accompanying 
‘charitable’ attitude/sensitivity; the sentimental self-
celebration which a philanthropic endeavour often allows 
for, even solicits - offering it in exchange for our monetary 
contribution. The need for social transformation - which 
ought to be insisted upon - is not obscured by the aid 
itself, but by its sentimental supplement; in Žižek’s 
words, by “the feeling good for having participated in the 
struggle.”2 While charity may truly help those in need, 
the sensitivity embodied in its affective texture - the 
obscene self-celbratory senstimentality that accompanies 
otherwise noble gesture - allows the structural causes 
of the problems to be reproduced. Namely, it creates a 
“multitude of sin.”
The possibility of criticality thus resides within 
the narrow, but properly autonomous, dimension of 
architecture; in its capacity to structure the affective 
backgound of everyday life. The emancipatory character 
of an architectural intervention is not embedded in 
its functional or symbolic content (both of which are 
regulated by social demands), rather it is determined 
through the affect which provides it with “a density of 
meaning” - relating it to the background of social fantasy. 
The critical task of architecture, which in its narrowest 
definition concerns itself precisely with determining 
the sensitive dimension of an architectural object, lies 
in substituting the charitable sensitivity permeating 
contemporary practice with a critical-emancipatory one.
The aim of the thesis, as its subtitle suggest, concerns 
a delineation of critical architectural practice arising out 
of Slavoj Žižek’s notion of the gap; a pre-transcendetal 
non-all that opens the space for an emancipatory act. 
The introductory chapter defines the gap, and reveals 
2. Slavoj Žižek in Living in the End Times, 
117.
xviii
the inadequacy of Žižek’s own explicit interventions in 
architecture theory to his underlying theoretical premises. 
The main body of the work, illustrates (using as its point 
of departure Adolf Loos’ story of the Poor Little Rich 
Man) the potentially oppressive character of architecture, 
and proposes a fourfold categorization of aesthetic-
architectural tendencies in order to define an emancipatory 
architectural practice. Finally, the conclusion, through an 
adoption of Zizek’s categorization of violence, opposes the 
notion of critical-emancipatory practice to the premise of 
non-geometrical form-making prevalent in contemporary 
architectural practice.


1Introduction: Thinking the Gap
2
3In contrast to his extensive commentary on 
film, literature and music, observations on the built 
environment are largely absent from Slavoj Žižek’s work. 
With the notable exception of a single essay explicitly 
devoted to the subject, the Architectural Parallax, Žižek’s 
contributions to architectural theory are confined to brief, 
tangential digressions, and stand-alone, unsupported 
assertions. In addition to an overarching, emphatically 
stated assertion of architecture’s significance as a site of 
ideological obfuscation (In Žižek’s words, architecture 
“is the place where they screw us, they construct the very 
space where we spend all our time.”1), and a material 
embodiment of human fantasies (articulated in Žižek’s 
gratuitous warning to architects: “when making your 
plans tread softly because you tread on the dreams of 
people who will live within ... your buildings.”2), Žižek’s 
intervention in architecture may largely be summarized 
in three distinct practical recommendations: (1) a 
proposal to re-appropriate non-functional excess spaces 
within a building envelope, specifically, a gap between 
skin and structure, for alternate uses (the main thesis of 
Architectural Parallax); (2) an insistence on the possibility 
of re-appropriating monumental, formally structured 
works commonly associated with authoritarian regimes 
for emancipatory politics (evidenced in his “admiration 
for baroque Stalinist ‘wedding cake’ kitch”3, as well as 
in his defence of seemingly fascist tendencies within the 
works of Jože PleČnik4); (3) and, finally, a  definition 
of emancipatory architecture as a practice devoted to 
generating a sense of disengagement, an “effect of the 
suspension of everyday functioning”5 (a proposition found 
in a single footnote in, Žižek’s self-proclaimed magnum 
opus, Less Than Nothing). 
In addition to Žižek’s explicit architectural 
propositions, we should posit another notion of 
emancipatory architecture implicit within his work, 
1. Slavoj Žižek. “Notes Towards a 
Definition of Communist Culture: 
Utopias.” Backdoor Broadcasting 
Company Academic Podcasts. (16 June 
2009.) http://backdoorbroadcasting.
net/2009/06/slavoj-zizek-masterclass-
day-2-notes-towards-a-definition-of-
communist-culture/
2. Slavoj Žižek. Living in the End Times 
(London and New York: Verso, 2010): 
278.
3. Žižek, Living in the End Times, 244.
4. Slavoj Žižek, “Everything Provokes 
Fascism.” Interview with Andrew 
Herscher. Assemblage 33 (1997): 62. 
5. Slavoj Žižek, Less Than Nothing (London 
and New York: Verso, 2012): 622.
Opposite: Fig. 1. Mass gymnastics in Prague, 
1907.
4in reference to which his explicit propositions operate; 
namely, a conviction in architecture’s capacity to 
emphasize a “pre-transcendental gap”6, an inherent non-
identity or inconsistency that, for Žižek, constitutes all 
phenomena. Each particular proposition reflects a distinct 
mode in which the gap appears. (1) The non-functional 
excess space, Žižek advises us to re-appropriate, is a gap 
(a non-identity) between architecture’s representational 
appearance and utilitarian function. (2) Žižek’s insistence 
on the possibility of re-appropriating “authoritarian” 
forms, similarly, reflects his belief in the inconsistency of 
normative liberal democratic politics (and consequently 
its insufficiency for emancipatory practice); namely, the 
gap between apparent liberal permissivity and powerful 
prohibitions regulating everyday life that characterize 
liberal society. (3) Finally, the sense of disengagement 
from the everyday that architecture, according to Žižek, 
ought to embody corresponds to a sense of the gap; a 
sense of uncertainty or disquietude within the peaceful 
certainty of the everyday.
In its most immediately familiar mode, the gap can 
be understood as an irreducible discrepancy between 
lived experience and symbolic representation. As Žižek 
illustrates through his standard reflexive retort to laudatory 
introductions he usually receives as a guest lecturer, one 
invariably perceives oneself as either inadequate to, or not-
fully accounted by, one’s social-symbolic appearance.
The description that was given of me, all those titles, 
books, professorships, in my miserable existence, I 
found it difficult to recognize myself in that figure 
of me. I held a gap between that complex symbolic 
identity, professor and so on, and simply me.7
6. Žižek, Less Than Nothing, 6.
7. Slavoj Žižek. “Architecture and 
Aesthetics.” Lecture at Arquitectura y 
Sociedad (Foundation for Architecture 
and Society), Pamplona, (10 June 2010). 
http://www.egs.edu/faculty/slavoj-zizek/
videos/architecture-and-aesthetics/ 
The Gap
5The gap between symbolic appearance and lived 
experience does not, for Žižek, imply a misrepresentation, 
or a lack of knowledge. Were he introduced as a miserable 
human being, or as a miserable professor, Žižek would be 
equally justified (albeit less gracious) to protest; to insist 
upon a distance separating him from the given identity. 
Regardless of the particular content of a description, one 
is inherently inadequate to, or not fully accounted for in, 
one’s social-symbolic appearance. A description one were 
to give of oneself would be no less false. The gap, which 
initially appears to separate different symbolic identities, 
a famous professor and a miserable human, thus describes 
an irreducible, constitutive excess of being that resists 
symbolization as such.
The overarching theoretical proposition at the heart 
of Žižek’s work - the injunction to emphasize the gap - 
consists of a secondary, “purely formal shift” (a dialectical 
reversal) “of transposing the tragic gap that separates the 
reflecting subject from the pre-reflexive Being into this 
Being itself.”8
[T]he most elementary figure of dialectical reversal 
resides in transposing an epistemological obstacle 
into the thing itself, as its ontological failure (what 
appears to us as our inability to know the thing indi-
cates a crack in the thing itself, so that our very fail-
ure to reach the full truth is the indicator of truth).9
For Žižek, we are not merely unable to fully identify 
ourselves in our social-symbolic identity - and thereby 
condemned to futile, Sysiphian task of reattempting 
impossible symbolization - but, the very alienation of our 
search comprises the authentic heart of our being. The 
gap - the sense of never fully belonging, never fitting a 
description of oneself, the unaccountable excess of our 
being - lies at the core of human subjectivity. In Žižek’s 
8. Žižek, Less Than Nothing: 15.
9. Žižek, Less Than Nothing: 17.
6words, our “cogito is not a substantial entity, but a pure 
structural function, an empty place”10; namely, the gap.
All particular symbolic identities (distinct positions) 
- which at first glance appear to delineate the gap - emerge 
purely as (ultimately insufficient) attempts to cover up 
our pre-existing lack; the emptiness of the gap. Žižek’s 
dialectical transposition of the gap “into the thing itself” 
thereby corresponds to an ethical principle; a call to 
endure the immanent struggle confronting us.
In our everyday lives, we constantly fall prey to 
imaginary lures which promise the healing of the 
original/constitutive wound of symbolization, from 
Woman with whom full sexual relationship will be 
possible, to the totalitarian political ideal of a fully 
realized community. In contrast, the fundamen-
tal maxim of the ethics of desire is simply desire as 
such: one has to maintain desire in its dissatisfac-
tion. What we have here is a kind of heroism of the 
lack: the aim ... is to induce the subject to assume his 
constitutive lack heroically; to endure the splitting 
which propels desire.11
Emphasis of the gap is a call to both renounce any 
imagined transcendental wholeness or balance that would 
allow us to reconcile with immanent tensions (such as our 
struggle for symbolization) we face, and, moreover, to 
fully identify these immanent tensions as the only (pre-)
transcendental truth. In a place where we expect to find 
higher order, harmony, or transcendental meaning, we 
should assume the immanent tensions of the gap itself. 
Žižek thereby opposes the gap to a notion of peace of 
transcendental emptiness. 
[T]his nothing is not the Oriental or mystical Void 
10.  Slavoj Žižek, Parallax View (Cambridge 
MA: MIT Press, 2008): 8.
11. Slavoj Žižek, Interrogating the Real 
(London: Continuum, 2005): 194.
7of eternal peace, but the nothingness of a pure gap 
(antagonism, tension, “contradiction” ), the pure 
form of dislocation ontologically preceding any dis-
located content.12
The gap thereby designates a purely formal, structural 
splitting; an internal imbalance that lies at the core of all 
phenomena. Since the gap precedes all particular content 
(which subsequently appears to delineate it), various 
modes of our encounter with the gap are homologous to 
each other. A personal struggle for authentic identity - 
as a gap separating distinct social-symbolic identities (a 
professor, a miserable human etc.) - directly corresponds 
with a political struggle for authentic social order - a 
gap separating different irreconcilable positions engaged 
in a political struggle (liberals, conservatives etc.). In 
all cases, particular positions that (appear to) delineate 
the gap consist of ultimately futile attempts to obscure 
its constitutive character by externalizing the cause of 
the tension. Each assumed symbolic identity, such as, a 
particular ethnic or professional identity, comprises an 
attempt to externalize the cause of our alienation onto 
an other who seems to prevent our full identification; 
an intruder  who disrupts our ethnic community, a 
competitor who obstruct our professional success etc. 
Positions engaged in a political struggle, similarly, consist 
of particular identification of an agent as the cause of 
experienced social problems (bankers whose greed caused 
economic crises, immigrants responsible for crime, 
ignorant masses holding onto xenophobic prejudices, 
terrorists disrupting our peace and safety etc.). Personal 
attempts to remove the obstacles preventing us from 
attaining a fantasized, desired symbolic identification, are 
correlative with political attempts to remove the guilty 
other disrupting a fantasized, desired social harmony. In 
both cases, the particular positions engaged in a struggle 
12. Žižek, Less Than Nothing : 38.
8(symbolic identities, or political beliefs) are comprised of 
different interpretations of the struggle itself - of its causes 
and goals - hence, rendering impossible any reconciliation.
In its political mode, Žižek’s shift, the assumption 
of a political position that emphasizes the constitutive 
nature of the gap, consists in identifying the cause of social 
problems within purely formal, structural contradiction 
inherent to a social order. Since, in as far as each particular 
position engaged in a political struggle consisting of an 
attempt to avoid the struggle and restore imagined social 
harmony is, simultaneously, grounded in an identification 
of an other who causes the struggle, the only position that 
allows us to escape the futile reproduction of constant 
social marginalization and exclusion, is the insistence on 
the inherent constitutive nature of social conflict. The 
position of assuming the constitutive nature of the struggle 
is directly opposed to normative calls to overcome political 
differences that are invariably sustained by their obscene 
opposite: an implicit identification of an other as a cause 
of the political difference. It is only by emphasizing the 
formal and constitutive nature of the gap - emphasizing 
the inevitability of the struggle as such - that we can avoid 
false, and ultimately repressive, reliance on particular 
(“ethnic”) agents as its cause.
The emphasis of the gap is thereby simultaneously 
a critical and an emancipatory act. As a critical act, 
the positing of the gap as a pre-transcendental truth 
precludes any transcendental justification of immanent 
injustice, forcing us to soberly confront problems around 
us as devoid of any higher, redemptive meaning. As an 
emancipatory act, insistence on the gap both opens up 
a space for sociopolitical transformation and enables the 
only possibility of social solidarity.
The solution of the tension is ... not to be found in 
9multicultural tolerance and understanding but in a 
shared struggle on behalf of a universality which cuts 
diagonally across both communities, dividing each 
of them against itself, but uniting the marginalized 
in both camps.13
Solidarity with an other - whom we can never fully 
understand and with whom we share no particular 
identity or aims - is possible only through a “resonance 
of struggles”. The only thing we share is that we are 
both struggling. (The immediate effect of Žižek’s self-
deprecating reflexive undermining of his own symbolic 
identity is precisely a solidarity with his audience.) The 
emphasis of the gap thereby opens up a space of the 
“commons” - a space unregulated by external authority 
(a space devoid of a transcendental guarantor) - within 
which an emancipatory collective becomes possible.
In “Architectural Parallax” (his sole sustained 
engagement with architectural theory) Žižek, adopting 
Alejandro Zeara-Polo’s identification of envelope as the 
core concern of architectural practice (the quintessential 
embodiment of architecture’s “iconographic” and 
“organizational” domains14) identifies the gap with non-
functional interstitial space: “a gap between the skin and 
structure,”15 clearly observable in many contemporary 
performance arts venues. The excess of non-functional 
space reflects architecture’s dual, representational and 
utilitarian, role. Contemporary performance arts venues 
(for Žižek, “the paragon of contemporary architecture”16) 
need to represent democratic, openness in their 
appearance, while simultaneously providing security from 
undesired social groups and enforcing social separation. 
The non-functional excess is thereby a reflection of a 
constitutive social tension; a split between explicit social 
13. Žižek, Living in the End Times, 138.
14. Alejandro Zaera-Polo, “The Politics of 
the Envelope: A Political Critique of 
Materialism,” Volume 17 (2008): 78.
15. Žižek, Living in the End Times: 261.
16. Žižek, Living in the End Times: 257.
The Spatial Gap
10
norms and effective social constraints.
In bourgeois societies, we are split between formal-
legal equality sustained by the institutions of a dem-
ocratic state, and class distinctions enforced by the 
economic system. We live the tension between, on 
the one hand, politically correct respect for human 
rights, and so forth, and growing inequalities, gated 
communities, and exclusions on the other. ... The 
effective message of the “political unconscious” of 
these buildings [performance arts venues] is demo-
cratic exclusivity: they create a multi-functional 
egalitarian open space, but the very access to this 
space is invisibly filtered and privately controlled. In 
more political terms, performance-arts venues try to 
enact civic normality in a state of emergency (excep-
tion): they construct an “open” space which is co-
cooned, protected and filtered.17
The constitutive non-functional by-product of social 
contradictions comprises, for Žižek, “the proper place 
for utopian dreaming”18; the space wherein these 
contradictions may be properly addressed. Consequently, 
a critical-emancipatory intervention consists in re-
appropriating the constitute excess for uses “for which 
they were not selected in the first place.”19
Are, then, the “interstitial spaces” opened up by 
the “disconnection between skin and structure” in 
performance-arts venues not ... functionally empty 
spaces open for exaptation20? The struggle is up for 
grabs here – the struggle for who will appropriate 
them.21
While Žižek’s conclusion is consistent with his 
identification of the gap as the site allowing for the 
17. Žižek, Living in the End Times: 254.
18. Žižek, Living in the End Times: 278.
19. ibid
20. “Exaptation”, a term Žižek borrows from 
biologists Stephen J. Gould and Richard 
Lewontin, refers either to the evolutionary 
process of adopting features that arose 
as “side-effects of adoptive processes” for 
another biological (or in case of Žižek’s 
applcation of the term to architecture, 
programmatic) function, as opposed 
to adaptation. Žižek, Living in the End 
Times, 277
21. Žižek, Living in the End Times, 278.
11
possibility of critical intervention, the notion of spatial re-
appropriation fails to transpose the gap into the domain 
of autonomous architectural practice. Rather than in-
itself revealing the constitutive nature of the gap, the 
critical-emancipatory capacity of spatial re-appropriation 
depends solely upon the critical-emancipatory character 
of the functional content with which the spatial excess is 
re-appropriated. The use facilitated by the space, rather 
than its architecture, provides the critique. Devoid of an 
emancipatory functional content, the re-appropriation of 
the non-functional merely prescribes already normative 
practice. Finding novel uses for hitherto unused (or 
underused) spaces characterizes the ceaseless drive 
towards increasing utilitarian efficiency and productivity. 
Instead of emphasizing the gap, Žižek’s proposition 
fills it, in the hope that its content may provide the critique 
which the architectural intervention failed to. Already in 
a review of Žižek’s initial presentation of Architectural 
Parallax22, Adrian Lahoud suggests a re-interpretation 
of Žižek’s proposition, advancing a secondary, implicit, 
reading.
The most obvious [reading of Žižek’s suggestion] 
is that the interstitial is a site for the fermentation 
of emancipatory possibilities; this reading has long 
precedents in architectural history, specifically to do 
with question of spatial marginality. There is a sec-
ond and more interesting reading, however... might 
we instead imagine a sort of ontological poché [the 
gap] that would inhere as an excess within the very 
register of design decision-making itself so that de-
cisions might begin to be understood as having au-
tonomy from each other?23
The gap separating the two readings, namely, the gap 
separating Lahoud’s suggestion of an excess within the 
22. First presented as ‘Parallax’ at the 2009 
Australian Institute of Architects National 
Conference.
23. Adrian Lahoud, “Architecture, 
Contingency, Crisis: An Interview with 
Slavoj Žižek.” Architectural Design (2010): 
115.
12
practice of design decision-making, and Žižek’s notion 
of a spatial, non-functional excess, may itself be read 
as a reflection of the initial gap between architecture’s 
representational appearance and utilitarian function. 
Whereas design decisions can transform appearances (it 
can modify the manner in which space registers in human 
experience), they cannot directly transform the social 
order whose demands, ultimately, determine the use of 
space. (As a functional object architecture can merely 
accommodate social demands with greater or lesser 
efficiency.)24 
The gap separates a dimension of the built 
environment regulated (even if not fully autonomously) 
by architecture, in its narrow definition as a practice 
concerned with appearance, and a dimension regulated by 
an external social order within which it operates, namely, 
its functional reality. Performance arts venues can only 
represent openness and democracy in their appearance, 
because they cannot embody open, democratic social 
relations in their function. The gap between appearance 
and function thereby separates architecture’s capacity to 
solve social problems confronting it, and political measures 
required for their resolution. Architecture can modify the 
manner in which our social order appears to us, but it 
cannot impose an alternate social order transforming the 
manner in which space is inhabited.
Whereas Žižek’s proposition transposes the gap 
separating appearance and function within the functional 
dimension of the built work - identifying a constitutive 
non-functional excess open for re-appropriation, the act 
of emphasizing the gap, suggested by Lahoud, consists 
in (mirroring Žižek’s initial proposition) re-doubling 
the gap, as an excess within architectural appearance. 
The second proposition is already implicit in Žižek’s 
24. As has been noted by critics of the work 
of OMA, its innovative programming 
(such as the institution of ‘field-like’ 
conditions striving to allow for contingent 
and diverse social encounters) can always 
be (and usually are) used to legitmize 
the power of institutional structures 
they accomodate. While architecture can 
more or less efficiently facilitate social 
demands (the quality of OMA’s work lies, 
despite the emancipatory rhetoric, in its 
effeciency, which nevertheless shouldn’t 
be discarded), to paraphrase Michel 
Foucault, freedom cannot be designed 
for. It can only be enacted. (Fortunatelly, 
architecture can also act.) See Dixon, 
Scott and Kim Dovey. “Architecture and 
Freedom? Programmatic Innovation in 
the Work of Koolhaas/OMA.” Journal of 
Architectural Education. (2002): 5–13.
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own work. Since, as Žižek otherwise emphasizes, the 
constitutive gap is purely formal. It cannot be reduced to a 
particular property of functional reality. No modification 
of  functional content embodies the gap. (Consequently, 
spatial re-appropriation does not constitute critical 
practice, as there is ultimately no directly emancipatory 
content for which space may be appropriated. An 
emancipatory act remains equally possible regardless of 
the use a space is designed for.) The gap within reality 
can only be registered as an excess within representative 
appearance. As Žižek himself notes in an interview with 
Glen Daly, a critical-emancipatory act (an emphasis of 
the gap) corresponds to the marking of the very need for 
appearance, within appearance itself.
[T]he true problem is not, how do we get from ap-
pearances to reality, but rather how can something 
like appearance emerge within reality? ... reality itself 
needs appearance, reality itself is not all. Appearance 
is precisely not an epiphenomenon. Appearance is 
inherent to reality. In other words, the Real persists 
as that failure or inconsistency of reality which has 
to be filled in with appearance. Appearance is not 
secondary; rather, it emerges through the space of 
that which is missing from reality.25
Pseudo-critical, ‘functionalist’, revelation of architecture’s 
functional reality, ostensibly obscured by its appearance, 
usually manifesting itself as a disregard of social demands 
for ‘proper’ appearance, is no more critical than ‘formalist’ 
disavowal of contradictions within functional reality. 
Both approaches miss the need for appearance that arises 
out of (and corresponds to) a lack in reality. Paradoxically, 
for Žižek, functional reality does not precede appearance, 
rather, on the contrary, it is the addition of appearance 
that renders reality consistent. “The moment we subtract 
25. Slavoj Žižek and Glen Daly, Conversations 
with Žižek (Cambridge UK: Polity, 2004): 
95.
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fictions [embodied in representational appearance] 
from reality; reality itself loses its discoursive-logical 
consistency.”26 Architecture devoted purely to functional 
efficiency, disregarding the “fiction” of appearance, often 
produces the most dis-functional spaces; having lost the 
fiction that structured its very functional reality. 
The gap can thereby only be revealed as an excess 
within appearance (itself an excess over functional 
reality); as the pure striving to appear, preceding any 
representational content of appearance, within appearance 
itself. The gap is reflected (re-doubled) in appearance 
as a gap between the representational dimension of 
appearance (its capacity to stand for particular concepts) 
and non-representational “appearance qua appearance;”27 
the domain of the “suprasensible” within appearance. 
The non-representational excess dimension of appearance 
should be equated with Deleuze’s notion of affect.28 
The affect  appears to us as a distortion (a gap) within 
representational space; a transfixing, captivating effect 
of appearance which cannot be accounted for by its 
representational dimension.
The dialectical reversal whereby Žižek’s initial 
architectural proposition (to re-appropriate non-functional 
excess) is transposed within architectural practice (as a 
gap within appearance: an affective, non-representational 
excess of appearance) can be illustrated by moving 
from the notion of architecture advocated by Alejandro 
Zaera-Polo (and endorsed by Žižek), to one proposed 
by Peter Zumthor. Whereas for Zaera-Polo, the proper 
site of architecture is the envelope - the quintessential 
embodiment of both representational and utilitarian 
concerns29, for Zumthor, architecture constitutes the 
affective background of our everyday existence.
Architecture has its own realm. It has a special physi-
26. Slavoj Žižek , Tarrying with the Negative: 
Kant, Hegel, and the Critique of Ideology 
(Durham: Duke University Press, 1993): 
88.
27. Žižek , Less Than Nothing, 692.
28. “[W]e call affect any mode of thought 
which doesn’t represent anything. So what 
does that mean? Take at random what 
anybody would call affect or feeling, a 
hope for example, a pain, a love, this is 
not representational. There is an idea of 
the loved thing, to be sure, there is an idea 
of something hoped for, but hope as such 
or love as such represents nothing, strictly 
nothing. Every mode of thought insofar as 
it is non-representational will be termed 
affect.” Gilles Deleuze. “Spinoza’s Concept 
of ‘Affect’.” <http://english.duke.edu/
uploads/media_items/deleuze-gilles-1978-
spinoza-s-concept-of-affect.original.pdf>
29. Zaera-Polo. “The Politics of the Envelope: 
A Political Critique of Materialism.”
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cal relationship with life. I do not think of it primar-
ily as either message or a symbol, but as an envelope 
and background for life which goes on in and around 
it, a sensitive container for rhythms and footsteps on 
the floor, for the concentration of work, for the si-
lence of sleep.30
The autonomous realm of architectural practice, the 
sole aspect of a work that retains minimal autonomy 
from social (or clients’) demands, corresponds to the 
overarching affect embodied within a work. (Affect 
cannot be prescribed simply because it cannot be 
represented.) Within a collective endeavor of building-
making, the seemingly narrow, yet irreducible, role of an 
architect consists in determining the particular sensitivity 
(an affect) permeating throughout the multitude of 
distinct, often technical, decisions. (The ultimate aim of 
an architect’s coordination of various consultants’ work is 
the sustenance of an affect within the final product.)
The affective property of an architectural object (the 
sensitivity embodied therein) cannot be reduced to a 
secondary by-product of its functional or representational 
content. Already, at the level of our immediate, everyday 
experience, we initially encounter the built environment 
purely as an affective appearance. Our notion of an object’s 
functional and representational value arises through a 
retroactive, inherently insufficient, attempt to account for 
its immediate affective presence. Although an architectural 
object, through our interpretation, invariably acquires 
particular functional and representational value (it seems 
to address particular functional and representation 
needs), function and representation are not its constitutive 
properties, both are developed, and constantly re-
developed, re-interpreted and re-appropriated, through 
the interaction of the work (as an affective presence) with 
30. Peter Zumthor, Thinking Architecture 
(Basel: Birkhauser, 1998): 13.
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the social context within which it is situated. The gap 
between functional and representational interpretation 
of a building (the seemingly commonsensical distinction 
between its appearance as a signifier and its use) may 
thus be re-interpreted, as separating two different, 
equally inadequate, attempts to account for architecture’s 
irreducible, unaccountable, power to affect us.31 In 
practice, the interpretative reduction of architecture to 
a functional/representational object invariably serves 
to mystify its immediate affective presence; obscuring 
affective oppression (and stifling critique thereof) 
beneath purported functional, or representational value, 
or conversely asserting architecture’s liberating affect as 
a product of its particular functional/representational 
content.
The ideological dimension of an architectural object 
lies, precisely, in its affective property. As Žižek insists, 
ideological fantasies (that distort our understanding of 
reality, and thereby, in Deleuze’s words, diminish our 
“power of acting”32) are not embodied in an explicit 
doctrine or practice (their “represented and constituted 
reality”33), but in an undergrowth of their implicit, 
affective texture, through which the explicit doctrine is 
sustained. The ideological dimension of an explicit text or 
practice is, Žižek maintains, always supported through an 
(obscene) affective supplement.
Deleuze’s account of fascism [which Zizek agrees 
with and expands onto ideology in general] is that, 
although subjects as individuals can rationally per-
ceive that fascism [or any ideology] is against their 
interests to follow it, it seizes them precisely at the 
impersonal level of pure intensities: ‘abstract’ bodily 
motions, libidinally invested collective rhythmic 
movements, affects of hatred and passion that cannot 
be attributed to any determinate individual. It is thus 
31. In more precise (Žižekian) terms, the 
“substantial” functional/representational 
reality of a work (its density of meaning) 
is itself constituted (“stitched together”) 
through the addition of an “in-
substantial” pure affective capacity.
32. Gilles Deleuze. “On Spinoza’s concept of 
‘Affect’.” http://english.duke.edu/uploads/
media_items/deleuze-gilles-1978-spinoza-
s-concept-of-affect.original.pdf
33. Slavoj Žižek. Organs Without Bodies (New 
York: Routledge, 2004), 188.
17
the impersonal level of pure affects that sustains fas-
cism, not the level of represented and constituted re-
ality... The struggle against fascism should be fought 
at this impersonal level of intensities not (only) at the 
level of rational critique - by undermining the fascist 
libidinal economy with a more radical one.34
The dependence of ideological doctrine’s power over 
its subjects on its affective, libidinal economy (providing 
an intensity of enjoyment) is illustrated in Žižek’s 
paradigmatic example of an ideological agent; a military 
doctor (from Žižek’s own army experience) whose power 
over his patients (his ability to humiliate one of them by 
ordering him to publicly masturbate) is sustained through 
ironic disavowal of the seriousness of his orders (smiling, 
laughing with other assembled soldiers waiting for their 
examination), ensuring that his exercise of power (the 
spectacle of public humiliation) is accompanied by an 
obscene sense of solidarity with the humiliated subjects. As 
Žižek recalls, even “the unfortunate soldier himself soon 
joined us with an embarrassed giggle, exchanging looks of 
solidarity with us while continuing to masturbate...”35 The 
capacity of ideology to humiliate its subjects, depriving 
them of a power to act, directly corresponds to its ability 
to also impose obscene enjoyment onto them.
[T]he agency of Power ... shouts severe orders, but 
simultaneously shares with us, [its] subordinates, ob-
scene laughter bearing witness to a deep solidarity. ... 
[A]ttitudes which are officially opposed and mutu-
ally exclusive reveal their uncanny complicity, where 
the solemn agent of Power suddenly starts to wink at 
us across the table in a gesture of obscene solidarity, 
letting us know that the thing (i.e. his orders) is not 
to be taken too seriously and thereby consolidating 
his power.36
34. Žižek is here paraphrasing Deleuze whose 
position, in this instance, he shares. Žižek, 
Organs Without Bodies, 188.
35. Slavoj Žižek, “From Joyce-the-Symptom 
to the Symptom of Power.” lacanian ink 
11 (1996). http://www.plexus.org/lacink/
lacink11/zizek.html
36. ibid
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A critical emancipatory act, subverting the mechanism 
of power, consists in transforming of the undergrowth of 
obscene injunctions “which the official, public ideological 
text simultaneously disavows and requires for its 
undisturbed functioning.”37 Although an ideology may at 
the official, explicit level prohibit enjoyment (as Deleuze 
notes, priests and despots “need the sadness [or more 
precisely, the guilt] of their subjects”38), for Žižek, explicit 
prohibitions are always accompanied with, and sustained 
through, implicit, obscene solicitations.39 The obscene, 
transgressive enjoyment at the affective, libidinal level is 
a necessary supplement to official, explicit prohibitions.
The lesson of totalitarian subordination is not “re-
nounce, suffer,” but this subordination offers you a 
kind of perverted excess of enjoyment and pleasure. 
To get rid of that enjoyment is painful. Liberation 
hurts.... [H]ow does a totalitarian power keep you 
in check? Precisely by offering you some perverse 
enjoyment, and you have to renounce that, and it 
hurts. So, I don’t mean physical violence, or a kind 
of fetishization of violence. I just mean simply that 
liberation hurts.40
The affect denied by ideology is, thereby, not enjoyment 
or pleasure, but a ‘painful’ renunciation of transcendental 
(ideological) re-assurance, and the ensuing sense of an 
irreducible anxiety and uncertainty. Suspension of our 
everyday ideological identification, our disengagement 
from a reassuring ideological fantasy, is always minimally 
anxious.
The liberating ‘pain’ of anxiety stands opposed to 
the ‘pain’ of guilt. Whereas, guilt reflects our attempts 
37. ibid
38. Deleuze, “On Spinoza’s Concept of 
‘Affect’.”
39. In case of contemporary (post-modern)
permissive ideology, this solicitation to 
enjoy, is, of course, made increasingly 
explicit, but nevertheless accompanied 
by a series of prohibitions. In either 
case, ideology consists both of guilt and 
enjoyment.
40. Slavoj Žižek, “Liberation Hurts: An 
Interview with Slavoj Žižek.” Interview 
with Eric Dean Rasmussen. electronic 
book review (2003).  http://www.
electronicbookreview.com/thread/
endconstruction/desublimation
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to fulfill impossible demands placed upon us by an 
external, transcendental authority (namely, within an 
ideological structure with solicits our enjoyment, guilt is 
a reflection of our inability to enjoy), anxiety correlates 
to our confrontation with our absolute responsibility; the 
absence of any external authority on which we can rely. 
[A]ccepting guilt is a maneuver which delivers us of 
anxiety... we withdraw from the dizziness of freedom 
... into the constraints of the externally imposed pro-
hibitory Law, so that the freedom which then arises 
is the freedom to violate the Law, freedom caught 
in the vicious cycle of Law and its transgression... 
When we obey the Law, we do it as part of a desper-
ate strategy to fight our desire to transgress it.41
The emancipatory dimension of anxiety releases us 
from a cycle, wherein “the more we obey ... the more 
we feel guilty.”42 Anxiety, thereby, both renders possible 
an authentic ethical act - an act reducible neither to 
obedience nor to transgression, and, as the affect “co-
extensive with the human condition”43, opens a possibility 
of a community unconstrained by the Law of prohibitory 
authority - a community not grounded in an exclusion of 
an other, an intruder, who does not share its particular 
identity.
The critical-emancipatory anxiety must also be 
opposed to cynical, pessimistic resignation. Cynicism 
designates, precisely, a return to the ideological position 
wherein a disavowal of an explicit doctrine is grounded 
in an implicit, affective sustenance of the same. Cynical 
disavowal of emancipatory possibility ultimately serves to 
dissipate our sense of anxiety, providing us minimal re-
assurance of transcendental consistency (even if, it is only 
a consistency of hopelessness). Consequently, in order to 
41. Žižek, Parallax View, 89-90.
42. Žižek, Parallax View, 90.
43. Žižek, Less Than Nothing, 622.
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maintain an authentic sense of critical anxiety, it must 
be, paradoxically, supplemented with, equally authentic, 
optimistic enthusiasm of committed engagement (a 
position Žižek ascribes to Alain Badiou).
[Insistence on anxiety as “the only affect which does 
not cheat”44] unavoidably ends up in some kind of 
cynical pessimism (which can be also masked as a 
tragic grandeur): all collective enthusiastic engage-
ment ends in fiasco, the truth can only be experi-
enced momentarily, in self-blinding acts of tragic 
authenticity in which we ‘traverse the fantasy:’ These 
moments cannot be sustained permanently, so the 
only thing we can do is to ‘play the (social) game;’ 
aware that it is ultimately a mere game of illusions. 
Badiou enables us to break out of this ennobled trag-
ic cynicism: enthusiasm is no less “authentic” than 
anxiety, a collective political engagement does not eo 
ipso involve imaginary misrecognition. This differ-
ence is absolutely crucial today - it is the difference 
between political death and life, between endorsing 
the reigning post-political cynicism and gathering 
the courage for a radical emancipatory engagement.45
The simultaneous sense of anxiety and enthusiasm 
comprises the affect of confronting the gap.  The addition of 
the latter (enthusiasm, courage...) is a necessary supplement 
preventing the return of transcendental assurance masked 
beneath cynical resignation. Ideological disengagement 
(our withdrawal from reassuring ideological certainties) 
does not correspond to a paralyzing fear of the unknown, 
but to a naive, passionate, optimistic engagement in a 
struggle for the future. The coexistence of anxiety and 
enthusiasm marks an authenticity of each.
Only through an enthusiastic engagement with the 
freedom opened up by anxiety, can the authentic sense 
44. Žižek is here paraphrasing Sigmund 
Freud. Slavoj Žižek, Less Than Nothing, 
622.
45. Slavoj Žižek, Less Than Nothing, 622-623.
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of anxiety - of an irreducible sense of an openness within 
reality - be maintained. 
[A]nxiety is the necessary background of enthusi-
asm: there is no enthusiasm without anxiety, enthu-
siasm does not begin in itself, it is formally the result 
of the conversion of anxiety.46 
Enthusiasm of our political engagement, our belief in 
the possibility of change, marks the authenticity of our 
ideological disengagement, our inability to draw comfort 
from transcendental certainty. In its narrowest definition, 
a revolutionary moment is an instance, where an anxiety-
inducing openness of future possibilities (a realization 
that no power is in control and no outcome is guaranteed) 
is engaged through an enthusiastic struggle over the 
definition of the future.
Žižek’s own, seemingly contradictory, political 
position, an enthusiastic commitment to revolutionary 
communism combined with rigorous, anxious questioning 
of any communist practice, reflects the paradoxical nature 
of his critical-emancipatory position. The authenticity of a 
commitment to a communist ideal, insistence on the need 
for social equality and liberty, is correlative with a ceaseless 
interrogation of its particular programme. Anxious, 
critical questioning is not the opposite of a commitment 
to practice (Žižek openly endorses real-life political 
options47), but the cornerstone of emancipatory political 
practice. Anxiety reflects an unwillingness to compromise 
radical emancipatory ideals, an unwillingness to exchange 
them for reassuringly attainable goals. Conversely, a 
possibility of rational, critical interrogation avoiding 
everyday ideological mystification, is only opened up 
through an enthusiastic commitment to a revolutionary 
ideal. Only a commitment to the possibility of 
46. Slavoj Žižek, Less Than Nothing, 838.
47. Most notably, current Greek oposition 
leader, Alexis Tsipras.
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revolutionary transformation (only a dream of revolution 
haunting our everyday political practice) prevents an 
obscene acceptance of immanent social tragedy, injustice, 
and oppression as inevitable or unavoidable - as if a part of 
greater natural harmony.48
Žižek’s insistence on the necessity of re-appropriating 
“totalitarian” forms and practices, such as his affirmation of 
the necessity of revolutionary terror (albeit, not necessarily 
bloody), insistence on an emancipatory dimension within 
public spectacles of mass gymnastics (including his re-
appraisal of the work of Leni Riefenstahl)49, assertion 
of the necessity of organizational discipline among the 
left (earning him accusations of left-fascism50), as well 
as, his professed love for formally rigorous “totalitarian”, 
“Stalinist” architecture should be read as reflecting the 
necessity of an optimistic, “utopian”, aesthetic sensitivity 
as a precondition for critical-emancipatory anxiety. The 
affirmation of a formal order and rigorous structure of 
representational appearance, is, for Žižek, necessary, in 
order to avoid cynical/ironic distance from ‘ideological’ 
commitment. 
The hero of Žižek’s emancipatory practice is 
the eponymous protagonist of Jaroslav Hašek’s anti-
authoritarian novel The Good Soldier Švejk. Josef Švejk 
is a working-class conscript in Austro-Hungarian army 
who ends up sabotaging the war effort, not through 
disobedience, but by obeying orders too literally, 
carrying them out to their absurd conclusion. It is never 
clear whether the consequences of Švejk’s actions are 
intentional or not; whether his apparent idiocy is real or 
faked. His over-enthusiastic proclamations “Long live the 
Emperor!” and “We shall win this war!” appear ironic 
and incendiary in the context of widespread, matter-of-
fact, anti war sentiment of the public. (The Czech public 
largely sympathized with their fellow Slavs whom they 
48. This is best illustrated by the gradual 
dissappearance of ‘practical’ social-
democratic welfare state (in Europe) and 
liberal civil rights (in United States), 
following the demise of revolutionary 
spirit in the post-1968 Western world.
49. Slavoj Žižek, “Learning To Love Leni 
Riefenstahl.” In These Times, (10 
September 2003). http://www.lacan.com/
zizekleni.htm
50. Alan Johnson. “Is Slavoj Zizek a Left-
Fascist?” The Telegraph, (1 January 2013). 
http://blogs.telegraph.co.uk/news/
alanjohnson/100195901/is-slavoj-zizek-a-
left-fascist/
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were supposed to fight.) When charged with sedition, 
Švejk cooperates with childlike innocence, trying to 
assist his captors, encouraging their strictness etc. While 
following the explicit rules (all too literally), Švejk violates 
the implicit meta-rules; the habits and customs, that 
comprise the unspoken affective framework necessary for 
maintaining normal power relations. For Švejk, formal 
loyalty to the Emperor coincides with a naive, matter-
of-fact, yet uncompromising egalitarianism. He treats 
everyone he interacts with the same dignity and respect, 
regardless of their widely diverging social status. When at 
the battlefornt he sees soldiers shooting, he shouts: “Stop 
shooting, there are people on the other side!”51
Švejk appears to lack a ‘sense of reality’; an implicit, 
unspoken understanding of “informal rules which tells us 
how we are to relate to explicit norms: how we are to apply 
them; to what extent we are to take them literally; and 
how and when we are allowed, even solicited, to disregard 
them;”52 an understanding of proper measure.53 Cynics 
(virtually all the other characters in Hašek’s novel) who 
maintain “critical” distance towards the Law (discreetly 
mocking it, breaking it in private) end up perpetuating it 
in practice. They pose no threat to the authoritarian order. 
Far from undermining authority, cynicism functions as its 
necessary affective supplement. Power tries to control our 
enjoyment, not by forbidding it with explicit rules, but 
by pressuring us to enjoy our discreet transgressions. (An 
emblematic figure of power is an undercover police agent 
who attempts to prove Švejk’s anti-Austrian sentiment by 
inducing him, while happily inebriated to sign popular 
anti-war songs.) Švejk undermines the injunction to enjoy 
not by not enjoying himself, but by enjoying too much 
- enjoying ideology too directly - without the expected 
transgressive cynical-ironic distance.
The basic paradox of the relationship between public 
51. Žižek, Less Than Nothing, 1.
52. Slavoj Žižek, Violence. (New York: 
Picador, 2008): 158.
53. Švejk successfully operates in the 
same, seemingly absurd, grotesque 
universe, where one constantly needs 
to read between the lines, that poses 
great difficulty for Kafka’s Josef K. 
(Coincidentally, Kafka and Hašek were 
contemporaries; both writing in 1920s 
Prague.) Švejk can be read as a comedic 
counterpoint to tragic Josef K; succeeding 
through apparent idiocy where the 
other one failed. See for example Hans 
Kragh-Jacobsen, “Prague: Kafka and 
Hašek.” < http://www.zeitzug.com/index.
php?option=com_content&view=article&
id=1110&Itemid=390>
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power and its inherent transgression is that the sub-
ject is actually ‘in’ (caught in the web of) power only 
and precisely in so far as he does not fully identify 
with it, but maintains a kind of distance toward it; 
on the other hand, the system (of public Law) is ac-
tually undermined by unreserved identification with 
it.54
Critique must appear as its opposite. Practices, that 
formally draw “the line of separation between ‘real 
problems’ and ‘ideological chimeras’” comprise “the very 
founding gesture of ideology: ideology is by definition 
self-referential - that is, it always establishes itself by 
assuming a distance towards (what is denounces as) ‘mere 
ideology’.”55 Affective reassurance (closure of anxiety) is 
always a product of reflexive, ironic distanciation; opposed 
not to the representational form of order, but to the naive 
optimistic dimension within it.
The target of critique is thus not the falseness of 
representation: the illusory, limited character of any 
consistent representation order which does not allow for 
real-life multiplicity and complexity. The gap (the excess 
of inconsistency) corresponds not to any substantial 
multiplicity of reality (that invariably escapes any 
representational order) but to a non-substantial (purely 
formal) excess within the order itself. The gap can only be 
revealed as an inherent inconsistency within an otherwise 
consistent order.
In its minimal definition, a critical-emancipatory 
gesture designates merely an avoidance of cynical/
ironic shortcuts enticing us to bypass the full affective 
consequences, of an inherent sense of anxiety within a 
represented order. The affect of the gap both cannot be 
represented and does not precede representation (does not 
exist without representation). It corresponds, precisely, 
to the constitutive ‘excessive’ effect of representational 
54. Slavoj Žižek, The Fragile Absolute, 148.
55. An idea Žižek ascribes to Jacques 
Rancière. Slavoj Žižek, The Plague of 
Fantasies. (London and New York: Verso, 
2008): 211n.
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appearance.
A simultaneous sense of anxious uncertainty and 
enthusiastic optimism lies at the core of every architectural 
project. An architectural intervention is invariably both 
accompanied by an optimistic enthusiasm - embodying 
our hopes for a tangible better future, and, as Mark 
Wigley observes, arises out of an irreducible doubt - an 
uncertainty that the intervention is meant to alleviate.
Whenever a society is unsure of something, it puts a 
building on top of this uncertainty. The most obvi-
ous example would be when somebody you love dies, 
you put a gravestone on top this impossible doubt, 
this gap, this horror. If you don’t know what the 
meaning of a political system is,... you put a build-
ing right there. So always surrounding us are these 
images of certainty, stability, authority, but they are 
actually always located in points of maximum inse-
curity and doubt.56
The constitutive sense of uncertainty on top of which 
architecture is situated reflects the constitutive anxiety 
of ideological disengagement. Our horror, or confusion, 
is not merely a product of external intrusion, but of an 
inability (or unwillingness) to reconcile this intrusion 
into a greater meaning provided by an ideological fantasy. 
The task of emancipatory critical architecture consists 
in re-inscribing this constitutive sense of uncertainty - a 
sense of suspension within everyday certainty - within 
an architectural intervention, while maintaining both its 
representational role as an image of certainty (as Wigley 
notes) and its utilitarian role as an efficient, functional 
object (as Žižek points out).57
56. Mark Wigley. “AD Interviews: Mark 
Wigley.” Interviewed by David Basulto. 
ArchDaily.  (18 Mar. 2009) http://www.
archdaily.com/17252
57. Žižek and Wigley were co-panelists 
on “Architecture and Pleasure” panel 
at the “1st Architecture and Society 
International Congress, Architecture: 
More for Less” hosted by Arquitectura y 
Sociedad in Pamplona on 10 June 2010.
Anxiety and Enthusiasm of 
Architecture
26
Architecture (together with design) is here unique: it 
has to generate [an] affect of suspension of everyday 
functioning, of disengagement, while simultaneous-
ly constructing buildings which still meet the mate-
rial needs of the people using it and thus function as 
part of everyday functional reality.58 
The crucial Žižekian insight (the dialectical shift), 
which is, in the case of architecture, missed by Žižek 
himself, lies in transposing the sense of critical anxiety 
as a paradoxical product of an over-commitment to 
its representational and utilitarian constraints. The 
representational and functional constraints of architecture 
do not limit its critical capacity. The constitutive nature 
of the gap, as a purely formal inconsistency rather than 
a particular, substantial, identifiable feature, can only be 
revealed as an unavoidable excess within the contingent, 
normative, socially imposed order. Architecture’s 
everyday functional and representational constraints 
merely provide it with the necessary formal order within 
which constitutive gap can be registered. The sense 
of critical anxiety can only be opened up through an 
over-representation of order, and an over-efficiency of 
utilitarian organization. 
The criticality of a work corresponds to its apparent, 
representational naivete; its over-emphasis, over-ascription 
of importance (missing the “proper” ironic or cynical 
distance) to its contingent, socially imposed constraints; 
enthusiacially, rigorously transposing these constraints 
into formal organizational principles. Opposed to 
critical-emancipatory architecture stands both ironic, 
uncommitted playfulness, and cynical, gloom of pseudo-
critique, which while transgressively undermining 
particular, representational and functional constraints, 
affectively re-produce a sense of transcendental order.
58. Žižek, Less Than Nothing, 602.
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The universal (pre-transcendental) dimension of the 
gap, for Žižek, corresponds to (and can only be revealed as) 
an inherent immanent gap within a contingent, particular 
content. (In Žižek’s words, “[t]he truth of transcendence 
is a radical gap in immanence.”59) Consequently, critical 
practice is both independent of its particular functional or 
representational content (critique is possible everywhere, 
ordinary, generic architecture, constrained primarily 
by demands for efficiency, possesses no less critical 
potential, than prestigious, representative structures), 
yet only achievable through an over-identification with 
its contingent particularities (the contingent demands 
imposed upon it).  A sense of simultaneous anxiety and 
enthusiasm emerges merely through (a negative, but 
nonetheless difficult, gesture) of avoiding compromises; 
whether pseudo-critical ironic disinvestment, or pseudo-
enthusiastic self-celebration. Žižek’s injunction to 
emphasize the gap should thus be read as affirmation 
of architecture’s inherent critical capacity.  Critique 
corresponds to a commitment to an architectural impulse 
as such; the core of simultaneous anxiety and enthusiasm 
propelling any architectural project.
The limited, fragmentary, and somewhat inconsistent, 
nature of Žižek’s engagement with architecture does not 
indicate an incompatibility of architectural and theoretical 
concerns. The difficulty in emphasizing the gap within 
architecture reflects architecture’s open admission of it. 
Perhaps, more so than any other discipline architecture is 
already aware of, and defined by, its inherent contradiction: 
form and function, appearance and use, limitation of 
architects’ power and the scope of problems confronting 
them, as well as, architecture’s constitute anxiety and 
its equally constitutive enthusiasm. If architecture is 
understood as the quintessential affective practice, a 
physical, material embodiment of affective intensities, it 
59. Žižek’s response to a question from 
Giorgio Agamben quoted in “Mind the 
Gap. Žižek, Hegel and the Metaphysics 
of Contingency”. Ernst Blog: Ernst Bloch 
on the Web. (25 January 2012) http://
ernstbloch.wordpress.com/2012/01/25/
mind-the-gap-zizek-hegel-and-the-
metaphysics-of-contingency/?
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comprises the very mechanism of Žižek’s emancipatory 
critique. Žižek’s intervention in film, literature or music, 
may be read not only as an interventions in their affective 
architecture, but also as calls to adopt quintessentially 
architectural affect within them.
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The need for critique in architecture, both as critique 
of architecture, and as architecture as social critique, arises 
out of a recognition that seemingly desirable interventions 
often aggravate problems they aim to resolve. Well 
intentioned attempts to render the built environment more 
beautiful and pleasant often destroy what, with hindsight, 
seem to be its most beautiful and pleasant features. Our 
former solutions become our new problems.
The seemingly paradoxical counterproductive 
dimension of architectural interventions is illustrated in 
Adolf Loos’ parable of The Poor Little Rich Man. Despite 
possessing seemingly all that one can desire - “[h]e had 
money and possessions, a faithful wife ... and a brood of 
children”1 - Loos’ eponymous protagonist, nevertheless 
finds himself precluded from true happiness; unable to 
enjoy his fortune. Perceiving himself as alienated from his 
authentic identity, and envious of others whose worries 
seem to be “charmed away by a great sorceress - Art!”2, 
the Poor Little Rich Man instructs a famous architect 
to transform his home, hoping that his true self would 
thereby be realized.
Every room formed a symphony of colours, complete 
in itself. Walls, wall coverings, furniture, and materi-
als were made to harmonize in the most artful ways. 
Each household item had its own specific place and 
was integrated with the others in the most wonder-
ful combinations. The architect had forgotten noth-
ing, absolutely nothing. Cigar ashtrays, cutlery, light 
switches - everything, everything was made by him. 
But these were no ordinary architect’s arts; no, the 
individuality of the owner was expressed in every or-
nament, every form, every nail. (It was a psychologi-
cal piece of work whose difficulty will be evident to 
1. Adolf Loos, “The Poor Little Rich Man” 
in Adolf Loos, Spoken into the Void: 
Collected Essays 1897-1900 (Cambridge 
and London: The MIT Press, 1982): 125.
2. ibid
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anybody.)3
At first, the Poor Little Rich Man felt pleased. He 
enthusiastically devoted himself to studying the Art of 
his home. But, soon a transformation took place in him. 
An environment where every ornament expressed various 
particularities of his personality increasingly burdened 
his mind. As if his entire existence were circumscribed by 
the details of his home, he found himself unable to act; 
trapped in a prison of his own making.
The happy man felt suddenly deeply, deeply unhappy. 
He imagined his future life... He was precluded from 
all future living and striving , developing and desir-
ing. He thought, this is what it means to learn to go 
about life with one’s own corpse. Yes Indeed. He is 
finished. He is complete!4
A negligible, yet irreducible, sense of oppression, 
similar to the one experienced by the Poor Little Rich 
Man, commonly accompanies our encounter with 
otherwise beautiful and inspiring works of architecture. 
Pristine new buildings often seem to dull our experience 
of the world, depriving it of what in retrospect appears 
as vibrant complexity and unconstrained potential.5 The 
ability of architecture to engender a sense of oppression 
is often ignored: dismissed as personal pathology, an 
understandable, but irrational nostalgia for the old, 
a small price to pay for the greater good of progress; 
or reduced to a problem of architecture’s functional 
performance or alleged symbolic meaning. The disregard 
of the experienced sense of oppression merely accentuates 
it. Like the Poor Little Rich Man, we learn to walk with 
our own corpses. Tolerating our oppression, we become 
our own oppressor; precluding ourselves from future 
living and striving, developing and desiring.
3. ibid
4. Loos, “The Poor Little Rich Man,” 127.
5. The development of the Olympic Park 
in London’s Lower Lea Valley provoked 
lament of “the violent trampling of this 
vibrant edgeland, home to abattoirs and 
breakers’ yards, newspaper printing plants 
and cooking-fat recycling plants, as well 
as both the largest church congregation 
and biggest pile of fridges in Europe. 
All this was to be swept beneath a 
pristine carpet of tarmac and undulating 
Teletubby mounds, a piece of golf-course 
urbanism dotted with sporting white 
elephants.” Oliver Wainwright. “The best 
architecture of 2012,” The Guardian, 
(5 Dec. 2012). http://www.guardian.
co.uk/artanddesign/2012/dec/05/best-
architecture-of-2012?INTCMP=SRCH
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The task of critique resides in transforming our 
sense of apprehension and discontent into a ground for 
an emancipatory architectural practice. From critical-
emancipatory position, the oppressive character of 
architecture resides not in a disregard of the old, or of 
its context, but in the lack of real novelty it offers. 
Misperceived as nostalgia is not the longing for the past, 
but a longing for a radically different future. Our sense 
of oppression is a mourning of a future that might have 
been. Not novelty, but a lack of ambition disappoints 
us. The sensitive failure of formally exuberant and often 
genuinely technologically daring projects is not grounded 
in their non-functionality or symbolic inadequacy, but 
in an absence of real (political) dreams. Their apparent 
confidence, a heroic disregard of the old, disguises 
cowardice; a failure to confront the world as it is, permeated 
by oppression and desire to transform it. Works acclaimed 
for formal and technological daring must be critiqued for 
their insufficient daring in transforming social relations. 
The failure of a work, its tendency to reproduce 
problems, must not be opposed with pseudo-wisdom 
of modesty that cautions us against excessive ambition 
and prescribes return to tradition. Rather than 
questioning aims, a critique must always be formulated 
as a condemnation of the manner in which our aims have 
been compromised, of self-imposed limitations, and our 
acts’ insufficiency to their own terms. 
The story of the Poor Little Rich Man, as well 
as Loos’ famous equation of ornament with crime, 
is usually read as a critique of excess.  The figurative 
crime of ornament (of which Loos implicitly accuses the 
Poor Little Rich Man’s architect) is equated either with 
superfluity - the non-functional excess of symbolic art-
value interfering with the Poor Little Rich Man’s home’s 
utilitarian use-value, or with inflexibility - the excess of 
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over-design6 that restricts adaptation or personalization. 
Loos seems to alternate between advocating functionalist 
architecture devoted to satisfying purely utilitarian 
demands (abandoning its symbolic role as an 
embodiment of identity),7 or architecture which would 
allow its inhabitants to participate in (or even direct) the 
transformation of their environment8 (enabling them to 
fluidly assume and transform their symbolic identity). In 
both cases, equating ornament with excess misses the core 
of its oppressive dimension, and the removal of the excess 
feature that seems to be prevent Poor Little Rich Man’s 
enjoyment reproduces the obstacle it sought to avoid.
The functionalist proposition - a home comprised 
of objects whose forms directly reflected their intended 
use, thereby smoothly accommodating ‘practical’ needs, 
would seem to be no less oppressive than a home filled 
with superfluous ornaments; nor more conducive to 
living and striving, developing and desiring. It would 
equally deprive the Poor Little Rich Man of space for 
authentic action, reducing him to a bare animal-like 
life. Similarly, the (more sophisticated) participatory 
notion of a versatile, transformable home that allows 
for registration of personal memory and identity, at best 
returns the Poor Little Rich Man to his original state, 
failing to ameliorate his perceived alienation - the in-
authenticity, which propelled his initial quest for Art. 
Diminishing the oppressive authority of the architect 
(or more relevantly, the developer), does not redress the 
opressive dimension of architecture itself, and transposing 
the cause of oppression onto an external figure, also 
obscures the subject’s own complicity in it. (Leaving aside 
particular changes to the home itself, participatory design 
would merely be oppressive more efficiently. It would be a 
more symbolically efficient version of the home designed 
by the famous architecture.)  Since, our built environment 
is always inherently incomplete, and ultimately malleable, 
6. See Hal Foster, Design and Crime. (New 
York and London: Verso, 2002): 14-17.
7. This reading of Loos is certainly supported 
by some of his writing. As has been 
noted Loos failed to develop a systematic 
analysis of the phenomena he critiqued. 
He offered a profusion of examples of the 
works he ridiculed without identifying 
(at least explicitly) their common feature. 
See Miriam Gusevich, “Decoration 
and Decorum, Adolf Loos’s Critique 
of Kitsch,” New German Critique 43. 
(Winter, 1988), 97-123.
8. See Daniel Willis, Emerald City. (New 
York: Princeton Architectural Press, 
1999), 130-132.
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advocating adaptability and versatility merely acclaims 
the already existing - defending it from an incursion of 
‘design’. It does not address (or even represses) a desire for 
design. 
The identification of the cause of Poor Little Rich 
Man’s unhappiness with his excessive desire for Art, 
or of excessive striving for symbolic identity, that 
characterizes participatory and functionalist readings 
of Loos’ story invariably prescribes practices whereby 
human desires for more than bare or transient being are 
themselves compromised and oppressed. In contrast to 
the condemnations of excess, an emancipatory critique 
must always identify the oppressive capacity of an object 
in its betrayal of its own purported aim. The most critical 
reading must also be the most naive. The failure of 
ornament, therefore, lies not in its non-functionality nor 
non-adaptability, but in its failure to express the subject’s 
sense of the self; namely, his only genuinely authentic 
identity.
The Poor Little Rich Man’s story should be read as 
narrating a shift in perspective wherein what formerly 
appeared as an external gap; a distance separating the 
protagonist’s  idea of himself and the outward appearance 
of his home (namely, his personal and social dimensions), 
is recognized as internal to the subject; a gap separating 
the subject and his perceived identity - a minimal, yet 
irreducible, distance between the Poor Little Rich Man’s 
own experience of himself and all the particularities of his 
identity which he now finds expressed in his home. With 
all his particularities embodied in his home, the Poor 
Little Rich Man suddenly experiences himself as pure (but 
actually existing) abstraction relating to all his particular 
features as something contingent.9 Whereas formerly the 
cause of his unhappiness was traced to his non-identity 
with his home (his social identity), once that discrepancy 
9. He becomes, in Žižek’s terms, proletarian. 
To be proletarian is to be devoid of all 
particular features. Loos’ story could 
thereby interpreted (in Marxist terms)
as an allegory of political struggle, with 
the Poor Little Rich Man as a potential 
revolutionary agent arriving at ‘class 
conciousness’.
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was eliminated, he suddenly confronts his own non-
identity with himself; the internal inconsistency, the 
inner splitting (the gap) at the core of human identity. The 
oppressive nature of ornament (as well as the oppression 
of functionalist and participatory architecture) lies in its 
inability to express the gap that constitutes the subject.
The failure of ornament lies in its compromise. The 
Poor Little Rich Man’s particular features expressed in it 
comprise an attempt to avoid the sense of the gap, to fill in, 
his internal non-identity with contingent particularities. 
Both the functionalist exclusion of the non-functional, 
and its pragmatic utilization as an identity marker or a 
transient sensory stimulant, are equally insufficient as a 
program for emancipatory architecture. They avoid the 
sense of the gap at the core of human existence.
 The Poor Little Rich Man’s melancholy anxiety 
should be read not as a problem to be avoided (a gap to 
be filled), but as an indication of his newfound awareness 
of a previously existing (and universal) condition. Loos’ 
fable would be far more tragic were the Poor Little Rich 
Man, albeit still precluded from living, striving, desiring, 
to accept this fate with cynical resignation; supplanting 
the lack of true living with ironic distance towards reality. 
The shift of perspective marked by his unhappiness 
is a painful, but necessary step. Anxiety should not be 
eliminated, but transformed into a ground for action. It is 
a first sign of possibility; a necessary ground for liberation. 
The critical task lies in re-inscribing the gap that separates 
our symbolic identity (the appearance of our home) 
from our self-experience, into our identity itself. (Loos’ 
apt naming of his protagonist as a man simultaneously 
rich and poor, by designating properties opposed to each 
other reflects the very non-symbolizable gap at the core of 
his self-identity). As Žižek notes, “the only ‘success’ the 
subject can gain is the reflexive shift of perspective which 
recognizes success in failure itself.”10 The only authentic 10. Slavoj Žižek, Less Than Nothing (London: 
Verso, 2012), 520.
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enjoyment, living, striving and desiring, lies in learning 
to enjoy the gap!11
The oppressive dimension of ornament corresponds 
to its function as a fetish.12 For Žižek, fetish designates an 
object or a feature to which one clings and which allows us 
“to endure all the dirty compromises of [our] life.”13 Fetish 
is a mark of a compromise. In In Defense of Lost Causes, 
Žižek provides a series of anecdotal and literary examples 
of fetish objects: a pet hamster, which embodies a loving 
husband’s disavowal of the death of his wife, allowing 
him “to talk coolly about his traumatic last moments with 
her,”14 until the hamster (formerly his wife’s pet) dies and 
the man suffers acute depression; a button, in a short story 
by Patricia Highsmith, that reminds a middle-class New 
Yorker living with an intellectually impaired son of a time 
when he had been able to strike back against his miserable 
destiny (by inexplicably assaulting a beggar from whom he 
would steal the button) and allows him to serenely endure 
his everyday “family nightmare”; a cheap, commemorative 
plate stolen by a disenchanted Stasi15 agent from his office 
- “his act of ‘small private revenge’ for all the compromises 
and humiliations of his life - stealing this plate was the 
only thing for which he could summon enough courage.”16 
For Žižek, the fetish operates as a de-sensitizing screen 
that allows us to separate our factual knowledge from our 
belief. It allows us to cognitively accept traumatic reality, 
while simultaneously neutralizing its full affective impact.
Far from obfuscating “realistic” knowledge of how 
things are, the fetish is, on the contrary, the means 
that enables the subject to accept this knowledge 
without paying the full [that is, affective] price for it: 
‘I know very well [how things really stand], and I am 
11. “I want us to enjoy our wounds!” Slavoj 
Žižek,, “From Hegel to Marx…and back 
to Hegel! The Dialectical Tradition in 
Times of Crisis.” Conference, São Paulo. 
(March 2013) http://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=vRJF1YuGzrM
12. The fetishistic dimension of ornament is 
already latent in Loos’ own writing. In 
his terms: fetish transforms ornament 
into kitsch. Ssee Miriam Gusevich, 
“Decoration and Decorum, Adolf Loos’s 
Critique of Kitsch.”
13. Slavoj Žižek, In Defense of Lost Causes 
(London: Verso, 2008), 298.
14. Žižek, In Defense of Lost Causes, 299.
15. The secret police of former East Germany.
16. Žižek, In Defense of Lost Causes, 297.
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able to endure this bitter truth because of a fetish (a 
hamster, a button . . .) in which the illusion to which 
I stick is embodied.’17
While fetishes, especially from a perspective of our narrow 
private concerns, often seem to “play a very constructive 
role by allowing us to cope with harsh reality”18, they 
invariably aggravate the very problems they seem to be 
ameliorating. By allowing us to avoid necessary critical 
examination, fetishes (much like Marx’ famous opiates) 
obscure the necessity of transformative action. 
A fetishist experiences a button or a hamster as 
an earthly trace of a greater, transcendental harmony, 
a counterbalance to the disorder of everyday reality, 
redeeming the discords and suffering of daily life 
(personal, social, as well as political struggles) in an fantasy 
of a higher (transcendental) unity. The fetish appears as an 
embodiment of imaginary resistance against oppression 
and injustice that we do not resists in our everyday social 
reality. It stands for a part of us which exceeds (transgresses) 
our daily conformity. The fetish seems to resist so that we 
do not have to: enabling us to bypass necessary (political) 
action that could fundamentally transform things. 
Confronted with apparent disharmony, a sense of 
higher, transcendent harmony can only be sustained 
through notional, fetishist transgression of explicit social 
rules, as if the subsequent survival of the social order we 
(in our fetish) pretend to rebel against re-assures us of its 
higher, transcendent virtue.
Loos’ equation of ornament and crime mistakes the 
crime being committed. A fetish is not a crime against 
law (an obscene superfluous excess, as Loos implies), 
but a crime of perpetuating an unjust, oppressive law.19 
(Fetishist ornament wastes a commodity more precious 
than energy and material. It wastes human dreams.) It 
17. Žižek, In Defense of Lost Causes, 300.
18. Žižek, In Defense of Lost Causes, 296.
19. This was certainly not Loos’ intended 
meaning. Loos did indeed associate 
tattoos with lawbreaking. He grounded 
his position in since discredited 19th 
century criminal anthropology. See 
Jimena Canales and Andrew Hershel, 
“Criminal Skins: Tattoos and Modern 
Architecture in the Work of Adolf Loos,” 
Architectural History 48 (2005), 235-
256.
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operates by re-appropriating our dreams and desires into 
a dream of order, and a desire for an authority (that would 
maintain a semblance of a harmonious universe in which 
we believe). Tattooed savages and degenerate aristocrats, 
criminals and ‘famous architects’, whom Loos collectively 
charges of ornament-crime, are guilty, not of transgressing 
restrictive social norms (such as Loos’ own norm of 
functionality), but of investing their daily activity into 
maintaining existing norms, into desperately attempting 
to keep things as they are.
Tattoos, as well as other pseudo-transgressive, 
deliberately non-conformist identity markers (recreational 
drugs, extreme sports, meditative spirituality, fondness 
for exotic music...) proliferating among social classes 
least inclined toward overt political engagement (namely, 
apolitical yuppies and capital-wielding elites) allow them to 
maintain a sense of positive self-identity when confronted 
with tragic consequences of their political complicity. The 
representation of transgression (the appearance of being 
more than what we do in our social reality) embodied in 
a tattoo provides a necessary affective distance allowing 
one to fully enjoy her/his conformity. The ornamentation 
of the Poor Little Rich Man’s home, similarly, reflects his 
need for a proper fetish; his desire to fully enjoy his own 
wealth and fortune. Ornaments (in which he attempted 
to capture all his particular features) can be read as an 
attempt to integrate his (otherwise unaccounted-for) 
social privilege within a greater ‘meaning’ (a product of 
his particular qualities), thereby allowing him to enjoy it 
without a sense of guilt.
The failure of a fetish, the price we pay for our 
enjoyment of social complicity, is, paradoxically, the 
denial of the authenticity that a fetish claims to embody. 
By grounding our identity in particularity (directly 
linking our particular features with a fantasy of universal 
order), it deprives us of our universal human dimension 
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as struggling individuals, and consequently of the sense 
of solidarity with others. A fetish deprives us of politics. 
To be human is, as Aristotle suggested, to act politically. 
Devoid of political struggle for social transformation we 
lose our properly human dimension; reducing ourselves 
to mere pleasure-seeking automata. The lack of living, 
striving, and desiring experienced by the Poor Little 
Rich Man, reflects his lack of engagement in politics. 
The inability to act is the inability to act politically. To 
be deprived of political engagement is to be deprived of 
properly human life.
Fetishes, as Žižek notes, obscure not our immediate 
awareness of conflicts and struggles (of which we are 
always aware), but the constitutive nature thereof. A 
fetish shields our deeply held beliefs in universal order 
and harmony from empirical knowledge of dissonant, 
conflicted everyday reality. Fetishization serves to reduce 
the dissonant everyday reality to an aberration of a 
universal harmony. In its most concise definition, a fetish 
is “an object that conceals the void.”20 It does not conceal 
positive knowledge. It conceals a void in a place where 
we expect to find reassuring order: divine justice, an 
organic social body, self-organizing efficient markets etc. 
Fetishes deny not the existence of concrete conflicts, but 
the conflicted core, the gap, of the totality of the social 
order itself. 
In “The Beauty of a Social Problem”, Walter Benn 
Michaels invokes Bertolt Brecht’s comments on the “Song 
of Great Capitulation” from Mother Courage. The scene, 
Brecht, notes... 
...will be ‘disastrous’ ‘if the actress playing Mother 
Courage invites the audience to identify with her’ 
because the ‘spectator’ will be deprived of the oppor-
20. Slavoj Žižek, Less Than Nothing (London 
and New York: Verso, 2012): 46.
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tunity ‘to feel the beauty and attraction of a social 
problem.’21
Fetishistic identification with the heroine, fixation 
on her concrete particular features, obscures the sense of 
confronting an abstract problem causing her immediate 
suffering. “[To ]feel the beauty of the problem,” Benn 
Michaels explains, “is precisely not to feel the pathos of 
the suffering produced by the problem; it’s instead to feel 
the structure that makes the problem.”22 The fetishist 
denial of a capacity to act (politically) corresponds to a 
denial of particular aesthetic sensitivity.  We are deprived 
of particular aesthetic experience: a sense of facing a 
structural problem, a sense of irreducible freedom as well 
as the anxiety of confronting conflict where solidity of 
order and stability is to be expected.
Both the functionalist and participatory architectural 
approaches are insufficient to liberating the Poor 
Little Rich Man, since they misidentify architecture’s 
oppressive dimension as a property of either its functional 
or representational content. A feature or a gesture can be 
fetishized, appropriated for the benefit of reproducing an 
existing social order, regardless of the function it serves, 
or the ideas it represents. Architecture accommodating a 
socially transformative program or transgressing formal 
aesthetic criteria may nevertheless engender faith in 
the stability and universality of the social order within 
which it is constructed; reassuring us that all necessary 
social changes can be accommodated within it. Similarly, 
explicitly subversive messages, images of suffering, 
disfigured shapes, and disturbing gestures can themselves 
serve as fetishes; reassuring us that the struggles and 
conflicts they openly display are nevertheless redeemed 
within a higher, transcendental order. 
21. Walter Benn Michaels , “The Beauty of 
a Social Problem,” The Brooklyn Rail, 
(October 2011)
22. ibid
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In order to account for the emergence of fetish, Loos’ 
seemingly commonsensical distinction between an object’s 
utilitarian function (its use-value), and its representational 
appearance (art-value) must be supplanted with a division 
(in the opposite direction) within appearance itself; a 
distinction between the representational and the affective 
dimension of architectural appearance. Architecture 
both represents particular ideas and embodies particular 
sensitivities. It can both be read, through formal, socially 
defined rules of representation, and sensed, through 
immediate, bodily engagement. The fetish is constituted 
as an affect: a sense of universal harmony (which can also 
appear within a representation of an explicit disavowal 
thereof); a reassuring sense of an ordered universe, of a 
higher meaning that redeems quotidian suffering, of 
transcendental stability and fatalistic certainty.
The distinction between the representational (explicit) 
and the affective (implicit) dimension of a work, parallels 
John Ruskin’s distinction between “external forms” and 
“internal elements” that together define an architectural 
style (in this case, the Gothic). 
Now observe: the chemist defines his mineral by two 
separate kinds of character; one external, its crystal-
line form, hardness, lustre, etc.; the other internal, 
the proportions and nature of its constituent atoms. 
Exactly in the same manner, we shall find that Gothic 
architecture has external forms, and internal ele-
ments. Its elements are certain mental tendencies of 
the builders, legibly expressed in it; as fancifulness, 
love of variety, love of richness, and such others. Its 
external forms are pointed arches, vaulted roofs, etc. 
And unless both the elements and the forms are there, 
we have no right to call the style Gothic. It is not 
enough that it has the Form, if it has not also the 
Opposite: Fig 2.2. Viktoria Binschtok, 
Wand#1. 
According to Benn Michaels, Binschtok’s 
photographs of traces on a wall of an 
unemployment centre, embody the sense 
of a social problem by “de-personifying” 
it.“[W]e can’t see whether they [whose 
traces Binschtok photographs] are lazy or 
hardworking, we also can’t see whether 
they are men or women or what their 
race is; in fact, we can’t even see (what 
Brecht wanted the audience to see in 
Mother Courage) their class. What the 
photograph shows instead is not a class 
but a mechanism—the “pivot”—that 
helps make the class system work.” 
Walter Benn Michaels , “The Beauty of 
a Social Problem,” The Brooklyn Rail, 
(October 2011) http://www.brooklynrail.
org/2011/10/art/the-beauty-of-a-social-
problem
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power and life. It is not enough that it has Power, if it 
have not the form.23
Both external forms and internal elements are 
simultaneously present within a work, yet they are 
independently registered in human experience. Whereas 
external, or representational forms are cognitively 
analyzed - read in reference to socially learned concepts -, 
internal elements, “the power and life” of a work, are felt - 
affecting us in our immediate bodily experience. 
In contrast to Ruskin’s chemical analogy, the 
relationship between forms and elements cannot 
be reduced to simple causality. Unlike the direct 
determination of a mineral’s material quality by its 
“constituent atoms,” external forms and internal elements 
of an architectural style are independent of each other. 
A building, Ruskin emphasizes, may posses particular 
external forms without corresponding internal elements, 
or vice versa, we may imply, it may posses particular 
internal elements devoid of corresponding external 
forms. The affect (internally) embodied in a work is not 
determined by the idea (externally) represented by it. As 
Ruskin implies, an affect is shared between situations of 
everyday life and art. It provides us with the background 
of, what he refers to as the builders’ “mental tendencies” 
or “moral characteristics.” The deepest, unspoken dreams 
and beliefs are embodied in affects. 
The affect of a work (the sensibility embodied in it) 
is registered in the domain of tones, intensities, relative 
degrees, gradations, proportions, colours and amplitudes. 
(It is grounded not in particular features, but in a 
relationship between the particulars.24) Yet although, the 
affect may be composed of relative qualities, it is no less 
solid and undeniable. A work possesses an affect, no less 
than it possesses form or function.
23. John Ruskin, Stones of Venice (London: 
Farber and Farber, 1981), 119.
24. In Deleuzian terms’ an affect is a 
“variation of intensity” that arises out of 
proximity or distance between distinct 
particular concepts, but is irreducible 
(non-representable) to a concept itself. See 
Gilles Deleuze. “On Spinoza’s concept of 
‘Affect’.” http://english.duke.edu/uploads/
media_items/deleuze-gilles-1978-spinoza-
s-concept-of-affect.original.pdf
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The non-representational nature of fetish, reflected 
in our inability to define particular fetishistic form or 
function, is often fatalistically interpreted to deny the 
possibility of, critical, non-fetishist, architecture. Since 
the fetishistic character of a work is not grounded in 
the categories through which architecture is usually 
interpreted, it may appear as if anything can be fetishized 
and appropriated. Fatalistic rejection of a possibility of 
critique or emancipatory practice within architecture 
is grounded in a misperception of affect as a secondary, 
ephemeral product of its representational and functional 
properties, and the personal qualities and memories of 
those engaged with it. Opposing the identification of 
affect as a property extrinsic to the work, Gilles Deleuze 
places it at its very core.
[Art] is no less independent of the viewer or hearer, 
who only experience it after, if they have the strength 
for it. What about the creator? It is independent of 
the creator through the self-positing of the created, 
which is preserved in itself. What is preserved - the 
thing or the work of art - is a bloc of sensations, that is 
to say, a compound of percepts and affects.25
Percepts and affects in a work owe nothing to those 
experiencing them. Moreover, whereas function of 
a buildings can be re-adapted for new uses, and its 
representational value is invariably re-interpreted within 
a changing social context, only the affect defines the 
building as a work of architecture. If, however, the affect 
is transformed, we may properly speak of a new work. 
The nature of affect, as both embedded in the 
work (separate from the personal memory of those who 
experience it), and separate from its representational 
dimension thereof, far from rendering critical practice 
impossible, or futile, opens up an irreducible space for 
25. Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari. What 
is Philosophy? (London and New York: 
Verso, 1994): 164.
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critique within architecture. Since fetish is neither a 
functional, nor a representational feature, architecture 
may be critical and emancipatory (non-fetishist) regardless 
of its function and representational meaning. Although 
architects are ordinarily expected to fetishize their work, 
to celebrate its particular functional or representational 
content (the use it is meant to serve), they nevertheless 
retain an irreducible freedom to critique: to misinterpret 
or distort the implicit, affective dimension of this demand. 
Affective dimensions of a work always remain within 
architects’ autonomous decision making.
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Aesthetic TendenciesThe non-coincidence of the explicit, representational 
dimension of appearance and its implicit affective 
dimension enables us to draw a distinction between 
order and disorder (or harmony and disharmony) both 
in the representational and the affective dimension. 
The semiotic square (see diagram) produced through a 
doubling of the order-disorder dichotomy, defines four 
distinct aesthetic tendencies of architectural practice: 
(1) First, architecture can both representationally and 
affectively express a belief in an ordered, harmonious 
universe. (2) It can representationally disavow higher 
order while nonetheless maintaining it affectively. (3) It 
can wholly disavow order and harmony. (4) And, finally, it 
can formally represent a belief in an ordered, harmonious 
universe, but disavow it affectively. The four aesthetic 
tendencies (or modes of appearing) can be designated as 
(1) naive-ideological (or corporatist: embodying a belief 
in a world structured as a body), (2) cynical-ideological 
(or fetishist), (3) cynical-critical (or transgressive), and 
(4) naive-critical (or emancipatory);26 where naiveté and 
cynicism are properties of representation, and critique and 
ideology are properties of an affect.
The fourfold categorization of aesthetic practice 
is already implied in Zizek’s reading of four German 
Idealists: poets Friedrich Schlegel, Schiller, and 
Hölderlin, and philosopher Hegel. Each figure, in Žižek’s 
reading, stands for particular proposition negotiating 
the gap between subjective freedom and social order; a 
particular attempt to redress the Poor Little Rich Man’s 
homelessness, reuniting him (a reflexive subject) with his 
authentic being.
For Schiller, free human life within nature and cul-
ture is possible if it achieves that kind of internal or-
ganization, determination from within, or harmony 
26. In their political manifestation they 
correspond to conservatism, liberalism, 
anarchy, and finally, emancipatory politics 
(Žižek’s communism).
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of parts that is characteristic of both natural and ar-
tistic beauty. In a beautiful natural object, we find, as 
it were, “the person of the thing”; we have a sense of 
“the free consent of the thing to its technique” and 
of “a rule which is at once given and obeyed by the 
thing;’ and this is a model for the free consent of an 
individual to the worth of a social repertoire or way 
of life. Friedrich Schlegel, on the contrary, seeks to 
enact a kind of imperfect yet always energetic free-
dom in continuous, ironic, witty, self-revising activity 
that characterizes romantic poetry-a kind of commit-
ment to eternal restlessness. ... Schiller believes in the 
subject’s integration into the organic substantial order 
- free selfhood can wholly appear in beautiful nature 
and art; Schlegel asserts the force of subjectivity as 
the constant unsettling of any substantial harmony.27
Schiller and Schlegel thus occupy the naive-ideological 
(or corporatist) and cynical-critical (or transgressive) 
positions on our square. The two are diametrically 
opposed. Whereas, for Schiller, authenticity corresponds 
to a complete expression of universal order and harmony, 
for Schlegel, it resides in a complete disavowal thereof.
Hölderlin occupies the intermediate, cynical-
ideological (fetishist) position: explicit, representational 
disavowal of universal unity combined with implicit, 
affective re-assertion thereof. For Hölderlin, it is only 
through a representation (explicit, narrative) of disorder 
(of a subject’s alienation from authenticity) that a sense of 
higher order can be achieved. The only way we can cope 
with (or overcome) our separation from our authentic 
being (the only way we can be intuitively re-united with it) 
is by explicitly representing this separation as the content 
of the narrative we are telling.
[Hölderlin’s] answer is what he calls the “eccentric 
27. Slavoj Žižek, Less Than Nothing, 15.
Opposite: Fig. 2.3. Four Aesthetic 
Tendencies
A similar categorization of contemporary 
aesthetics is offered by Fredric Jameson 
in The Seeds of Time. Jameson proposes 
to systematize “the rich plurality of styles 
[of ] postmodemism” (pg. 131) into a 
semiotic square, producing categories 
of  ‘high modernism’, ‘dirty realism’, 
‘deconstruction’, ‘critical regionalism’ on 
axis ‘innovation-replication’ and ‘totality-
part’ (pg. 133). Fredric Jameson, The Seeds 
of Time (New York: Columbia University 
Press, 1994): 131-133.
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path” : the split between substance and subjectivity, 
Being and reflection, is insurmountable, and the only 
reconciliation possible is a narrative one, that of the 
subject telling the story of his endless oscillation be-
tween the two poles. While the content remains non-
reconciled, reconciliation occurs in the narrative form 
itself...28
The reconciliation, a sense of order and harmony, cannot 
be read in the narrative, but it can be intuited29 in the 
form of the non-reconciled narrative. Whereas for 
Hölderlin, a transcendental order (a sense of harmony) 
remains, albeit unrepresentable - accessible only through 
intuition, Hegel, who stands for the fourth, naive-critical 
(or emancipatory) position abandons the presupposition of 
an order beyond immediate disorder. For Hegel, disorder, 
the gap of separation, is inherent to the transcendental 
order itself.
Hegel occupies here a fourth position - what he adds 
to Hölderlin is a purely formal shift of transposing 
the tragic gap that separates the reflecting subject 
from pre-reflexive Being into this Being itself. Once 
we do this, the problem becomes its own solution: it 
is our very division from absolute Being which unites 
us with it, since this division is immanent to Being. ... 
Being as the inaccessible pre-reflexive Ground disap-
pears; more precisely, it reveals itself as the ultimate 
reflexive category, as the result of the self-relating di-
vision.30
Žižek (at least in his immediate analysis) seems to interpret 
Hegelian reversal as an inversion of preeminence Hölderlin 
affords intuition over representation - abandoning intuition 
as the site of authenticity, and returning to representation 
as the only site of truth. The reversal could, however, 
28. Slavoj Žižek, Less Than Nothing, 14.
29. Intuition (a term used in the tradition of 
German Idealism) refers to an immediate 
knowledge (a sense) of an object that does 
not require a concept to mediate it. See 
Frederick C. Beiser, German Idealism: The 
Struggle Against Subjectivism (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 2009): 298.
30. Slavoj Zizek, Less Than Nothing, 15.
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Corporatist
formal order +
affective harmony
equally be read as an inversion of their respective relation 
to order. The properly emancipatory position would thus 
consist (diametrically inverting Hölderlin) in positing the 
authentic sense of transcendental disorder as a product 
of representational order. The sense of disorder, the gap 
of separation, is inherent to the represented order itself. 
The systematic nature of Hegel’s philosophy (notably, its 
claim to represent the totality and the Absolute) can be 
read as both an ontological and aesthetic precondition for 
conceiving radical incompleteness.
The four positions are, of course, not equal. They are, 
as Žižek notes, “three plus one.” All position, other than 
Hegel’s, “remain ... metaphysical, clinging to the notion 
of a pre-reflexive Ground”, retaining the “presupposition 
of a substantial being beyond the process of (self-)
differentiation.”31 Only with Hegel, where our “very 
division from absolute Being” immediately unites us with 
it, do we cease relying upon a transcendental authority for 
redemption of our everyday alienation, and fully confront 
the gap.
In the first aesthetic approach, a work is conceived 
as an embodiment of a complete and consistent 
transcendent order. Corporatist architecture strives to 
transcribe abstract universal principles onto concrete, 
material particularities of a site; transforming the 
disorder, complexity, and transience of the latter, into 
the stability, permanence, balance and harmony of the 
former. It is characterized by platonic forms, cardinal 
axis, grids, and by irreverent erasure of particular features 
of the site in order to incorporate it within a universal 
order. Corporatist architecture conceives of itself as a 
struggle, comparable to warfare or medicine. A designer is 
perceived as a hero...
31. Slavoj Zizek, Less Than Nothing, 16.
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...who after a struggle succeeds in arresting disorder 
and monstrosity on the site and constructs the per-
fect palace or the perfect city in the same way that he 
overcomes the enemy on the battlefront.32
Much like a classical physician whose aim is to restore 
the proper balance of humours in a body, corporatist 
architect’s work consists of restoring proper proportion 
and symmetry to the environment. 
Corporatist practice may be seen as characteristic 
of pre-modern cultures. Early urban centres were often 
planned as replicas of the universe, centered around a 
sacred, forbidden place.33 Architecture of temples and 
palaces strived to represent the cosmic or moral nature of 
a social order in which it was constructed.
The practice of architecture was interwoven with 
ritual while the theory was bound up with concep-
tual systems of divination... formal perfection was be-
lieved to be the outcome of moral perfection-which 
is, in the end, a version of the doctrine of purity and 
harmony.34
Corporatism is the aesthetic of Renaissance paintings of 
Ideal Cities, Albert Speer’s design for Nuremberg Nazi 
rally grounds, the Pyramids (as they were originally 
meant to be), and the Villa Rotonda. Ancient aristocrats 
found corporatism re-assuring. The nouveaux riche found 
it aspirational. Modern state bureaucracies and corporate 
headquarters derived from it tradition which they 
otherwise lacked.
Corporatist architecture attempts to connect 
everyday lived experience within a particular social order 
with a universal order of nature or of gods. It aims at a 
symmetry between human, architectural, social, and 
32. Alexander Tzonis and Liane Lefaivre, “The 
Question of Autonomy in Architecture.”  
http://tzonis.com/dks/dks/publications/
online%20publications/1984-HAR-
The%20Question%20of%20Autonomy.
htm
33. Although, to some extent, the designation 
of corporatist practice as archaic merely 
reflects contemporary disapproval thereof, 
its provenance in pre-modern society 
is undisputed. See Paul Wheatley, The 
Pivot of the Four Quarters: A Preliminary 
Enquiry into the Origins of the Character of 
the Ancient Chinese City, (Chicago: Aldine 
Publishing Company, 1971)
34. Tzonis and Lefaivre, “The Question of 
Autonomy in Architecture.”
Opposite: Fig. 2.4 Fra Carnevale, The 
Ideal City. 
A place where imperfections are not 
permitted.
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cosmological bodies. Those who wish to return the world 
to an imagined golden age of purity, harmony, balance, of 
clearly delineated boundaries, of a social order of smoothly 
operating hierarchies are the architects of coropratism. 
Wishing to appear as conforming to divine or natural 
order35, their forms are “dictated by the directives of 
‘purity’ or ‘harmony’ and taboos of pollution.”36 Tragedies 
and suffering, pollution and imperfection are interpreted 
as an outcome of earthly violation of transcendent 
harmony. Corporatists claim that the solution to human 
problems lies in assuming our ostensibly natural, or 
divinely-ordained place in a hierarchic order that is at 
once social and spiritual.
Ultimately, corporatist attempts to eradicate 
impurities, end up reproducing them. Attempts to 
maintain an image of tranquil social hierarchy, requires 
violent exclusion of those who do not fit in it. The 
appearance of peace and harmony is paid for by hidden 
everyday social violence, often worse than the one 
corporatist aestheticians sought to eradicate. As the Poor 
Little Rich Man learned, attempts to keep the world pure 
require impurity of exclusion and oppression at its core.
Recurring failure of naively ideological, corporatist 
norms to produce the harmonious world they promise, 
a realization that impurities and imperfections are 
caused not only by outside disruption, but by one’s 
attempts to maintain the order itself, ultimately leads 
to the abandonment of the aim of conformity to a 
universal order, and the substitution of architecture’s 
transcendental purpose with a variety of profane goals. 
Instead of embodying universal harmony, in the fetishist 
aesthetic tendency (perhaps the most common today), 
architecture professes pleasure or utility37, or, most often, 
35. Contemporary corporatists attempt to 
ground their notion of a natural order 
in complex scientific models. See Nikos 
Salingros, A Theory of Architecture, or 
Christopher Alexander’s aptly titled The 
Nature of Order: An Essay on the Art of 
Building and the Nature of the Universe.
36. Lefaivre and Tzonis, “The Question of 
Autonomy in Architecture.”
37. “Decline in the belief in the norms of 
purity and in the divine order coincided 
with the emergence of utilitarian norms 
and... of norms that refer to form itself.” 
Lefaivre and Tzonis, “The Question of 
Autonomy in Architecture”
Fetishist
formal disorder +
affective harmony
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a combination thereof as its ultimate goal. It explicitly 
disavows beliefs in transcendental truths, and expresses, 
cynical or ironic, distance towards traditional norms of 
harmony and purity.
The expressive, twisted, shattered, cantilevering, 
asymmetrical, forms that predominate in contemporary 
architectural practice, as if embarrassed by or afraid 
of, the naiveté of their corporatist predecessors posit 
themselves as reflecting an awareness of the complexity 
of the world, disavowing stifling hierarchies in favour of 
openness, rational provision of practical needs, or sensual 
excitement. Both sensual and utilitarian formal norms 
are fetishistic. Both the utilization of form purely as a 
sensual stimulant or an iconic image, and, its apparent 
opposite, the self-professed denouncement of formalism 
in favour of ostensibly functional needs, stand opposed 
to the corporatist aim of utilizing form as an explicit 
manifestation of the transcendental order. Both claim to 
be devoted to satisfying merely our more or less practical, 
profane quotidian needs and desires.
For Žižek, this cynical/pragmatic attitude, that 
disregards “pathetic ideological phrases, and follows only 
utilitarian and/or hedonistic motivations”38 invariably 
coincides with fetishization that allows the same 
disavowed, “ideological” beliefs to flourish.
Cynical distance is just one way - one of many ways 
- to blind ourselves to the structuring power of ideo-
logical fantasy: even if we do not take things seriously, 
even if we keep an ironic distance, we are still doing 
them.39 
Explicit disavowal of a belief in transcendent order (the 
cynical distance) is, often, crucial in order for them to 
remain operative. In abandoning a claim to embody 
38. Slavoj Žižek, “The Spectre of Ideology” 
in Mapping Ideology. (London: Verso 
2012): 15.
39. Slavoj Žižek,The Sublime Object of Ideology 
(London: Verso, 1989): 30.
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transcendental order, architecture simultaneously allows 
itself to serve as a fetishistic support for our belief in 
the order it claims to have abandoned. Fetishization 
corresponds to a transposition of a belief and its 
accompanying norms from representation (where they 
were explicitly acknowledged) into affective texture. 
Prohibitions that are explicitly abandoned return as 
prohibitions of affects.
In Baroque (the official style of the Counter-
Reformation) formal, representational displacement, 
transformation, oblique projection, even transgression 
of the pictorial frame served to maintain faith in 
a hierarchically ordered universe; and its earthly 
representative, the Catholic Church. Oblique, elliptical, 
sensuous forms illustrated (as novel research in optics, 
central to the development of the Baroque suggested40), 
that the apparent complexity of everyday life is, in fact, a 
product of transcendental perfection, much like shapes of 
increasing complexity were discovered to be projections of 
perfect Platonic forms onto curved, or twisted surfaces. 
Twisting, deformed geometry, even the transgression 
of the frame is no less perceived as a product of perfect, 
consistent divinity. The Baroque permitted transgressive 
form in order to communicate, all the more powerfully, an 
oppressive affect; a sense of higher power unconstrained 
by laws mere humans can perceive.
Similarly, in post-Fordist labour practices, explicit, 
formal freedom, an injunction to pursue our dreams, to 
realize our potential, coincided with increasingly stronger 
affective prohibition, a prohibition on melancholy or 
disapproving attitude, an injunction to enjoy. The shift 
from labour as “a matter of producing things” to labour 
as a dissemination of sentiments41 (namely, the profusion 
of affective labour, of “supplying [one’s] energies physical 
and emotional in the service of others”42) paralleled an 
40. See Angela Ndalianis. “Architectures of 
Vision: Neo-Baroque Optical Regimes 
and Contemporary Entertainment 
Media.” MIT Communications Forum. 
http://web.mit.edu/comm-forum/papers/
ndalianis.html
41. Employees at the international food chain 
Pret a Manger, their manager notes, are 
expected to be “smiling, reacting to each 
other, happy, engaged.” Paul Myerscough, 
“Short Cuts.” London Review of Books, 
Vol. 35 No. 1·3 (January 2013) 25. < 
http://www.lrb.co.uk/v35/n01/paul-
myerscough/short-cuts>
42. Paul Myerscough, “Short Cuts.”
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official, cultural commitment to individual liberty; 
allowing relaxation, or open transgression, of traditional 
dress codes (and all representational codes), and emphasis 
on displaying one’s individuality.
Fetishist tendency is, above all, defined by a need to 
project a certain sensitivity; namely, a (self-)celebratory 
affirmation of functional performance, and a (self-)
confidence in its capacity to remedy (social) issues 
confronting us. Fetishist architecture must imply that 
problems are indeed solvable within the coordinates 
of the present social order, which is, thereby, rendered 
as equivalent to a divine or a natural one. While at the 
formal, representational level, everything seems possible 
and all appearances are permitted; forms and functions 
may be unconventional, uncanny, flexible, open, non-
hierarchical, disordered an affect other than self-cebratory 
self-confidence (a sense of being free of problems, as 
opposed to Brecht’s sense of the problem) is prohibited. 
Despite its representational freedom, fetishist architecture 
affectively legitimizes the institutions it houses and the 
social order within which it operates.
The symbiotic relationship of prominent 
contemporary architects with authoritarian politics43, is 
not only indicative of architects’ indiscriminate willingness 
to accept commissions, but also, more importantly, of 
their authoritarian clients’ (far more discriminating) 
taste (even need) for fetishist works. Although architects’ 
engagement with politically repressive regimes could be 
justified as a strategy to encourage sociopolitical changes44 
(the strategic choice between engagement and detachment 
must always be grounded in the particularities of a 
situation), the authoritarian character of their architecture 
resides not in architects’ acceptance of authoritarian 
commissions, but in its compatibility with authoritarian 
clients’ fantasies.45 Fetishistic architecture is politically 
43. While designing Heydar Aliyev Cultural 
Centre in Baku (“at the request of Ilham 
Aliyev, Heydar’s son and current Azeri 
dictator”), “Hadid stopped by Baku 
and was televised laying flowers at the 
grave of Aliyev, a former kgb chief and 
the ruler of Azerbaijan until his death 
in 2003.” See Hrag Vartanian, “Is 
Contemporary Architecture a PR Panacea 
for Autocrats? Western Architectural 
Ethics & Undemocratic Nations.” 
Brooklyn Rail (September 2008) <http://
www.brooklynrail.org/2008/09/artseen/is-
contemporary-architecture-a-pr-panacea-
for-autocrats>
44. Apologia for engagement as a means 
of transforming authoritarian society is 
exemplified in Jacques Herzog’s statement: 
“It’s very cheap and easy for architects and 
artists and film-makers to pull out or to 
make this kind of criticism ... Everybody 
knows what happens in China. All work 
conditions in China are not what you’d 
desire. But you wear a pullover made 
in China. It’s easy to criticise, being far 
away. I’m tempted almost to say the 
opposite...How great it was to work 
in China and how much I believe that 
doing the stadium [and] the process of 
opening will change radically, transform 
the society. Engagement is the best way of 
moving in the right direction”. Excerpts 
from a conversation between Herzog & 
de Meuron and Tom Dyckhoff in The 
Guardian, March 14th, 2008, cited in 
Alejandro Zaera-Polo, “The Politics of 
the Envelope: A Political Critique of 
Materialism,” Volume 17 (Archis, 2008): 
79.
45. Which are, of course, implicit fantasies 
of transcendent order and harmony, such 
as the idea of self-organizing efficient 
markets etc.
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oppressive, irrespective of its clients’ particular politics or 
its particular programmatic content.  Even if architecture 
efficiently resolves practical issues, its affective cynicism 
(and injunction to celebrate and enjoy) hinders its practical 
successes; constraining them to the space allowed by 
authoritarian imagination.  Its oppressive quality lies in its 
exclusion of (or incompatibility with) dreams of political 
emancipation.
Fetishistic tendencies of contemporary architecture 
are epitomized in OMA’s CCTV headquarters in 
Beijing. In Beijing Manifesto, Rem Koolhaas describes 
the building as a “bent” skyscraper; a traditional high-
rise tower “broken” into segments and subsequently 
rearranged into a giant loop. The result is a work of 
remarkable technological audacity and awe-inspiring 
formal extravagance; a structure that, in Koolhaas’ 
own words, “violates some of the most sincerely held 
convictions about logic and beauty.”46 The transgression 
of representational notions extends not only to their 
traditional forms, but also to any formal principles it itself 
claims to derive from.
The fetishistic character of a work is reflected in the 
non-coincidence of representational appearance to any 
formal principles it may claim to derive from (namely, 
its informality). While CCTV’s shape is conceptually a 
“skyscraper loop”47, its final shape (see figure) explicitly 
violates the purity of its notion by adding additional 
asymmetrical sloping to its roof and walls. Although 
the asymmetry may (claim to) be grounded in practical 
constraints (a structural need for inward sloping columns, 
or a programmatic need for a sloping roofline etc.), 
it is crucial to the project’s fetishist efficacy. Devoid of 
additional asymmetry, the building would, for a fetishist 
taste, appear excessive; too serious, too committed to an 
“ideological” position, devoid of ironic or cynical distance 
46. Rem Koolhaas “Beijing Manifesto” in 
WIRED 08 (2004): 126-127.
47. ibid
Opposite: Fig. 2.5. CCTV on CCTV. 
Fetishist architecture demanded by 
ideology.
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upon which fetishism depends. Fetish-ornament is not 
grounded in a claim of particular meaning. In its most 
precise, efficient mode, fetish functions, on the contrary, 
as an explicit disavowal of meaning; claiming to address 
purely practical, profane concerns, reflecting functional 
needs or purely sensual desires. A fetish is thus an object 
which explicitly insists on its own meaninglessness 
(representational emptiness), yet as such, as an empty 
signifier, it serves as an anchor for our explicitly disavowed 
belief. The bent, broken appearance of the CCTV, its 
explicit disavowal of any order and harmony, allows it to 
anchor the transcendental nature of the existing social 
order; namely to support the belief in a higher harmony 
of a politically authoritarian and economically liberal 
Chinese state.48
Political failure of the CCTV is unrelated to its 
inefficient use of resources, hidden symbolic meanings, 
or even the authoritarian nature of its client (namely, 
the propaganda organ of the Chinese state). Although 
these accusations may be valid (and, in themselves, 
important), they do not constitute a political critique 
of architecture. The oppressive nature of a project, its 
suitability for fetishization, is, as always, purely a product 
of a compromise in its own ambition; of an inability to 
fully, affectively, assume its formal audacity. Koolhaas 
is right to argue that both the inefficiency of his design, 
and the authoritarianism of his client, are justified in 
as much as they allow for, an otherwise impossible, 
“Promethean” architecture. The oppressive limitation of 
CCTV corresponds purely to its betrayal (a compromise) 
of its self-professed “Promethean” character. The heroism 
and audacity of its formal expression is absent in the 
manner in which it engages us in its sensual reality as 
a material object. The representational transgression 
coincides with affective normativity; an inability to 
transgress sycophantic, self-celebratory timidity. While 
48. Hence one of the main accusations 
leveled by malicious critics on OMA’s 
design, and one most vigorously opposed 
by Koolhaas, was to assert an (obscene) 
symbolic meaning to the building. “[A] a 
Chinese critic published an article saying 
that the building’s contorted form, which 
frames an enormous void at its center, 
was modeled on a pornographic image 
of a naked woman on her hands and 
knees. ... forcing Mr. Koolhaas to issue a 
denial.” Nicolai Ouroussoff. “Koolhaas, 
Delirious in Beijing.” The New York Times. 
(11 July 2011) http://www.nytimes.
com/2011/07/13/arts/design/koolhaass-
cctv-building-fits-beijing-as-city-of-the-
future.html?pagewanted=all
Opposite: Fig. 2.6. OMA’s ‘skyscrapper 
loop’ and, immediately, its distortion.
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the structure is openly displayed on the facade, allowing 
us to cognitively read the powerful forces of tension and 
compression at work, the bodily sense of the same, an affect 
of powerful imbalance, is constrained. The transgression 
operates only at the level of representation. Instead of 
distorting our sense of an office building, CCTV remains 
merely a formally distorted office building.
The compromise of a fetishistic project is thereby 
twofold. First, it avoids the full formal consequences of 
its own concept; signaling distance from any explicit 
principles, by bending and breaking them. Second, it 
avoids the full affective consequences of its own formal 
distortion; re-assuring us that distortions are merely 
representational. The withdrawal, the  compromise of 
ambition, is necessary in order to allow for a sence of 
confident, self-celebration. The achievement of CCTV 
(the measure of its greateness among fetishist buildings) 
lies precisely in its successful taming of its own powerful 
forces, beneath the normality of its curtain wall envelope 
and the functionality of its spaces. Fetishism, ultimately, 
relies upon and celebrates obscene self-control. The ability 
to perform a daring gesture, but step back before its 
disquiting consequence.
Apparent, formally explicit disavowal of order 
and harmony grounds fetishism only in so far as it 
avoids its own affective consequences. The possibility of 
technological audacity and formal extravagance (openly 
offered, even demanded, by authoritarian politics) comes 
at the price of obscuring critical affectivity; an inability 
to embody a sense of a constitutive contradiction, of “the 
beauty of the social problem”. The remarkable and awe-
inspiring formal extravagance, admirable efficiency, or 
programmatic innovation, is all too often, a desperate 
attempt to maintain everyday affective prohibitions.
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The transgressive aesthetic tendency, denouncing 
the contradictions of fetishism, attempts to extend (to 
accelerate, or intensify) the representational transgression 
of the former into the affective dimension. Much like 
fetishism, transgression is not bound by any seemingly 
‘natural’ laws of structure, or economy-of-means, but, 
unlike fetishism, it is also free of affective necessity or self-
celebratory enjoyment that renders formal transgressions 
acceptable to an existing social order. Liberated from all 
external conventions, and resolutely avoiding any social 
instrumentalization of its aims, transgressive works 
replace all norms (even the most profane utilitarian and 
sensual ones) with the norm of liberating transgression. 
Transgressive opposition to normativity is grounded 
in a speculative identification of shock with emancipation. 
Acceleration and intensification of  “the loss of certainty, of 
centre, of history”. increasing “change and superficiality” 
“through clash and disjunction,” Bernard Tschumi claims 
corresponds to “a weakening of architecture as a form of 
domination, power, and authority.”49 The transgressive 
gesture thus claims to be both critical, awakening us 
to our alienated condition, and liberating, allowing for 
hitherto obstructed enjoyment. In its narrowest definition, 
transgression is an inversion of the norm of pleasure 
and displeasure. Authentic pleasure (or enjoyment), the 
living, striving, and developing sought by the Poor Little 
Rich Man, transgressors claim, coincides with critical 
displeasure (or shock), an amplification of everyday 
alienation.
The norm broken by transgressive practice is often 
interpreted as separating architecture from art. Whereas 
art appears unconstrained in its critical capacity (explicit 
opposition to social norms has been a recurrent motif of 
20th century art), architecture appears to be constrained 
49. Bernard Tschumi, Architecture and 
Disjunction, 237.
Transgressive
formal disorder +
affective disharmony
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by functional and representational limitations. Attempts 
to traverse the division between art and architecture 
(different “individual arts”) are exemplified by Situationist 
“unitary urbanism.”50 In contrast to architectural practice 
grounded in functional, or representational demands, 
Constant Nieuwenhuis and Guy Debord explicitly 
posit its aim (namely, the aim of unitary urbanism) as 
construction of affective ambience. 
Unitary urbanism, independently of all aesthetic con-
siderations, is the fruit of a new type of collective cre-
ativity; the development of this spirit of creation is the 
prior condition of unitary urbanism. ... The creation 
of ambiances favorable to this development is the im-
mediate task of today’s creators. ... The construction 
of a situation is the edification of a transient micro-
ambiance and of the play of events for a unique mo-
ment in the lives of several persons. Within unitary 
urbanism, it is inseparable from the construction of a 
general, relatively more lasting ambiance.51
Constant’s project for New Babylon, the most 
comprehensive attempt to create unitary urbanism - an 
ambience of creation, strives simultaneously to convey the 
desirability of future society - the playful world of Homo 
Ludens - and provide a “condemnation of a morality that 
still regards labor that can be performed by a machine as 
the fulfillment of man’s life.”52 
New Babylon is a simulation of a situation of total 
liberation—of an abolition of all norms, conven-
tions, traditions, and habits. The project radicalizes 
and idealizes the transitory aspects of the experience 
of modernity. It imagines a world in which all that is 
fleeting and transient has acquired the force of a law.53
50. Constant and Guy Debord, “Amsterdam 
Declaration.” http://www.cddc.vt.edu/
sionline/si/amsterdam.html
51. Constant and Guy Debord, “Amsterdam 
Declaration.”
52. Constant, “New Babylon: The World 
of Homo Ludens.”1970. http://www.
notbored.org/homo-ludens.html
53. Hilde Heynen, Architecture and 
Modernity, 152-153.
Opposite: Fig. 2.7. Constant, New 
Babylon - Group of Sectors Photomontage. 
Disorder and disquietude.
67
68
Sense of liberation is coincident with an acceleration 
of existing urban transience; abandoning any recourse 
to organic pre-modern social order. As Hilde Heynen 
notes, the product of this transgressive equation is a sense 
of tension and anxiety permeating through Contant’s 
drawings. 
[F]ragile shapes are opposed to compact ones, dark is 
opposed to light, dynamic lines are contrasted with 
static volumes. Sometimes tension is produced by the 
rhythm of the walls that give structure to the space 
depicted, or it issues from the movement of the hu-
man figures or from the distortions of perspective. 
This tension can be seen as indicative of the continual 
oscillation between the liberating and disturbing im-
pressions that the viewer is subjected to. On the one 
hand, New Babylon fulfills one’s expectations of an 
absolutely free space, where the individual can con-
struct his own environment as he pleases, exploiting 
to the full its creative possibilities. Movable walls, lad-
ders, elevators, and stairways suggest a possibility of 
endless journeys and constant new encounters. The 
individual can project himself onto his environment 
within a general structure that harnesses the poetic 
potential of technology to the full. On the other 
hand, these drawings also betray a feeling of unease. 
The indifference with which the earth’s surface has 
been stripped, the huge scale of the structures sup-
porting the sectors, the endlessness of the interior 
spaces that never seem to permit any contact with the 
outside world.54
Obsessive transformability of New Babylon reflects an 
identification of formal order with the suppression of 
creative differences in the face of the vibrant multiplicity 
of everyday existence. The repetitive monotony of order, 
54. Heynen, Architecture and Modernity, 168.
Opposite: Fig. 2.8. Constant, 
Ladderlabyrinth. 
“As a utopian vision of the future, New 
Babylon therefore arouses feelings of 
dread rather than of desire: dwelling 
in a situation of pure indeterminacy 
apparently does not respond to our 
deepest wishes and desires.” Hilde 
Heynen, Architecture and Modernity, 172.
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transgressors claim, attempts to eliminate the complexity 
of disordered reality. The transgressive opposition of 
order (at its most basic, repetition) and difference reflects 
an inability to think radical difference; difference not 
as something imposed onto a neutral, undifferentiated 
field (through our assumption of particular transgressive 
identities), but difference as intrinsic, constitutive 
characteristic of the field itself.55
The nightmare of monotonous, self-perpetuating, 
undifferentiated non-places, which haunts transgressive 
architecture, reflects its deep insensitivity towards lived 
reality. Formally formulaic North American suburbs, 
repetitive Soviet apartment blocks, or undifferentiated 
junkspace are never sterile or monotonous in their 
experienced reality. They are permeated with differences, 
emerging through everyday use, passage of time etc. 
Difference does not emerge, as a by-product of comparing 
distinct pre-existing identities. For Žižek, (as well as 
Deleuze) radical difference (the gap) is the universal 
preceding the particularity of various identities. The 
transgressive opposition to order, and insistence on 
the multiplicity of particularities, does not preserve 
difference, but, on the contrary, serves to obscure the 
radical difference as such. Far from revealing constitutive 
difference the transgressive insistence on formal, 
representational distinction is an attempt to mask it. 
Ultimately, transgressors do not fear order, but a more 
radical disorder permeating through it.
Similarly, transgressive separation from the 
normative everyday; identifying itself as an exception to 
a constricting social order - an other place, a heterotopia, 
which as Heynen points out, permits no (or little) 
contact with the outside. To be engaged in politics, 
transgressors suggest, is to step outside; to separate oneself 
from everyday “economic” needs that define our daily 
55. While nominally striving to generate 
or sustain differences, both fetishistic 
and transgressive practices obscure, in 
Deleuzian terms, the ‘difference in itself ’; 
namely, “the difference that is freed from 
identities seen as metaphysically primary.” 
(note 1) In Žižeks reading of Deleuze’s 
Difference and Repetition, “the radically 
New [radical difference] emerges only 
through pure repetition.” (note 2)
_____
note 1: Daniel Smith and John 
Protevi, “Gilles Deleuze”, The Stanford 
Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2013 
Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), http://
plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2013/
entries/deleuze/
note 2: Žižek is here using Deleuze to 
illustrate the limitation of Hegel. Slavoj 
Žižek, Less Than Nothing, 455.
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lives. (“Politics”, from a transgressive standpoint, stands 
opposed to normative, “apolitical” market demands.) 
The insistence upon the need for separation ultimately 
precludes the very possibility of critique in whose name 
it justifies itself; mitigating the critical impact the works 
may otherwise posses. The need to signal separateness 
elevates the order it opposes to a fully-consistent, self-
sufficient transcendental truth; again, avoiding the radical 
gap within the order. The transgressive desire to shock, to 
break the norms of a social order, fails to recognize that 
the order is always already broken, internally unstable 
and inconsistent, desperate for an outside intervention to 
stabilize it. The separateness from the ordinary56 opens 
the transgressive for appropriation by it; the transgressive 
object is thus often reduced to a ‘freak show’ that sustains 
the normative fantasy of a consistent social order.
While, in her reading, Heynen interprets the 
tension within Constants’ drawings as an unintended 
revelation of an internal limitation of “utopian world free 
of inequality and oppression,” ultimately suggesting the 
“impossibility of giving utopia a concrete form,”57 the 
emancipatory insufficiency of transgressive architecture 
does not resides in its excessive utopianism. The suggestion 
of an impossibility of utopia, which Heynen uncovers 
in Constant’s drawings, marks, instead, their utopian 
insufficiency. Rather than excessive, transgression is not 
radical enough. The inherent limitation of transgression 
can, yet again, be interpreted, as a failure to fully follow 
through its own premises. If, as Tschumi rightly insists, 
there is an inherent disjunction in architecture (already 
inherent in the confrontation of space and event) and 
consequently, “architecture is constantly unstable, 
constantly on the verge of change”58, this formal instability 
need not be formally represented. 
In spite of the authenticity of its affective confrontation 
56. Thr need for separation is also the 
critical limitation of Pier Vittorio 
Aureli’s insistance on the plinth. See Pier 
Vittorio Aureli, The Possibility of Absolute 
Architecture. (Cambridge Ma.: MIT Press, 
2011)
57. Heynen, Architecture and Modernity, 
173-174.
58. Tschumi, Architecture and Disjunction, 19.
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with tensions and struggles that characterize social 
problems, transgressive works fail to disturb corporatist 
social fantasy. Although they may convey the sense of 
disorder, they fail to locate it within the transcendental 
order itself. In its desperate attempt to escape the logic of 
fetishism, transgressive practice ultimately reproduces it. 
The ultimate (political) effect of Tschumi’s works, such as 
the follies in Parc La Villete, and Constant’s drawings of 
New Babylon, is invariably a return to fetishism; either as 
a product of inability to achieve critical affectivity, or as 
the inability of the latter to appear desireable. Despite his 
transgressive writing, Tschumi’s built works are effectively 
fetishist. His works, much like Koolhaas’ reassure us that 
the ostensible affective novelty embodied therein is already 
possible within an existing social order. In Constant’s 
case, the undesirable character of his proposals, similarly, 
reassuring us in the inevitability, or even desireability, of 
the existing. 
Formal insistence on disorder and separation is 
ultimately itself oppressive. It represses our desire for a 
positive order other than the existing.
In its critical-emancipatory mode, architecture is 
explicitly conceived, much as in its corporatist tradition, 
as an embodiment of divine order and harmony, yet 
the order it represents (whereas corporatist order is 
hierarchical, emancipatory order is egalitarian) coincides 
not with a sense of transcendental stability, but with 
struggle and conflict. The commitment to order serves to 
reveal inherent disorder (the gap) within it. To be critical-
emancipatory, architecture must be formally enthusiastic, 
committed to a social ideal.59 
The coincidence, and mutual necessity, of formal 
order and affective disorder is reflected in Immanuel 
59. Insistance on a formal order is paralleled 
in Badiou’s notion of ‘affirmation’, 
or in Pier Vittori Aureli’s ‘absolute’. 
See Alain Badiou, “The Manifesto of 
Affirmationism.” and Aureli, The Posibility 
of Absolute Architecture.
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Kant’s critical injunction. In contrast with transgressive 
ethos, Kant did not oppose thoughtless obedience, 
with thoughtful disobedience. Instead, he commands 
us to “obey, but think!”60 Only by remaining explicitly, 
representationally obedient (maintaining an image of 
order) can we be affectively (and effectively) critical. 
Similarly, to use another example, when confronted 
with traumatic, conflicted social reality, attempts to 
formally maintain an appearance of order can be more 
disruptive to our belief in universal, transcendental 
justice than the direct representation of conflict itself. 
It is much more traumatic to witness a suffering other’s 
desperate attempt to maintain impossible dignity (to 
maintain a representation of order), than to witness the 
most brutal aspects of their hardship. The former strips 
us of our ability to maintain mere sympathy (along with 
an unspoken charitable infantilization), and forces us to 
confront the necessity of political solidarity.
Only the representational claim to embody universal 
order can disrupt our reassuring (affective) belief in an 
ordered universe. In order to emphasize the radical 
nature of the gap, it is insufficient to show disharmony. 
Instead, it is necessary to show discord within harmony 
itself. Constitutive tension, as opposed to represented 
(constituted) tension, is revealed only when things are 
seemingly in their proper place. 
The relationship of explicit, representational stability 
with implicit, affective disquietude is, in architectural 
practice, often conflated to a dichotomy between the 
exterior and the interior of an architectural object. In 
buildings, such as, Peter Zumthor’s Bruder Klaus chapel, 
solid, formal simplicity and stability of the exterior encloses 
a burnt, bent interior. Inside the chapel (the place one may 
expect to find order and harmony) a visitor is, instead, 
60. “Immanuel Kant countered the 
conservative motto “Don’t think, obey!” 
not with the injunction “Don’t obey, 
think!” but rather “Obey, but think!” ... 
[W]e must resist the populist temptation 
to act out our anger and thus wound 
ourselves. Instead of such impotent 
acting-out, we should control our fury 
and transform it into an icy determination 
to think things through in a really radical 
way...” Slavoj Žižek, First as Tragedy, Then 
as Farce. (London and New York: Verso, 
2008): 17.
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confronted with contorted traces of inferno. While in 
Zumthor’s chapel, the sense of disorder is embedded in 
material and form, in Mies’ Crown Hall, the explicitly 
classicist premise of its exterior, its symmetry, proportion 
and stability, is betrayed by the functional reality of its 
interior; an open space facilitating a multitude of profane, 
conflicting uses. Instead of divine certitude foreshowed 
by its temple-like exterior, we are instead confronted with 
chaos of profane activity. (Crown Hall houses IIT’s school 
of architecture.)
The dichotomy between exterior and interior may be 
read as a last attempt to reduce (or avoid) architecture’s 
critical-emancipatory potential. While this distinction 
(admittedly less sharp in Mies’ building) undeniably 
sustains an emancipatory experience, displaying in-
consistency at the core of representational order, its 
effectiveness is reduced to a particular sequence of 
experience. The particularization of architecture as object 
(a sharply delineated space with a clear distinction between 
interior/exterior boundary) opens it to fetishization, such, 
as the reduction of Bruder Klaus chapel to a pilgrimage 
site. The pilgrimage itself, or at its most minimal the ritual 
of entering the building,  can itself serve as a fetish. 
In its radical dimension, critique must be possible 
everywhere. Critical-emancipatory practice must convey 
the two (representational order and affective disorder) at 
the same time.
A critical-emancipatory attempt to reveal constitutive 
disorder within tension within order is illustrated in Agnes 
Martin’s paintings of grids and John Ruskin’s notion of 
Gothic style. While explicitly depicting a neutral stable 
network of lines (a quintessential representation of order) 
Martin’s grids serve to record minor imperfections: 
minute moments where lines fade or meander due to 
an imperfection of the material or the unsteadiness of 
Opposite Left: Fig. 2.9 Bruder Klaus 
Chapel Exterior
Opposite Right: Figure 2.10 Bruder Klaus 
Chapel Interior
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the artists’ hand. At the level of our experience of an 
artwork, Martin’s paintings do not depict perfection and 
universality - they depict precisely a failure to depict it. 
The universality of Martin’s grids is not a universality 
of perfection, but a universality of failure. The sense of 
beauty derived from seemingly endless repetition lies 
in a hope to uncover a sense of openness and anxiety 
beneath a veneer of stable harmony. Similarly, for Ruskin, 
the liberating character of Gothic architecture resides 
precisely in its disclosure and tolerance of imperfections 
that arise through an attempt to reach perfection. Much 
like the faults in Martin’s hand-drawn lines, Gothic 
imperfection is not an outcome of a compromise; of doing 
less than possible, or striving for less than perfect. On the 
contrary, for Ruskin, imperfection is the only possible 
outcome of an authentic, uncompromised striving for 
perfection. Any explicit ‘perfectness’ would inevitably be 
a remnant of compromised ambition; of our preference for 
“the perfectness of the lower nature to the imperfection of 
the higher.”61
While in all things that we see, or do, we are to desire 
perfection, and strive for it, we are nevertheless not to 
set the meaner thing, in its narrow accomplishment, 
above the nobler thing, in its mighty progress; not to 
esteem smooth minuteness above shattered majesty; 
not to prefer mean victory to honorable defeat; not 
to lower the level of our aim, that we may the more 
surely enjoy the complacency of success.62
Ruskin’s position should not be reduced to advocacy 
of primitive technology, a fetishization of the hand of 
which he is often accused, rather, it proposes a particular 
approach toward technology as such; an irreverent pursuit 
of possibilities offered by a technology to the point of 
revealing their intrinsic failure; their “shattered majesty.” 
61. Ruskin, John. “The Nature of Gothic.” 
in The Genius of John Ruskin; Selections 
From His Writings. Edited by John. D. 
Rosenberg. (New York: G. Braziller, 
1963): 177.
62. ibid
Opposite: Fig. 2.11 Agnes Martin, Wood I
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Implicit in Ruskin’s argument, is a belief that enthusiastic 
striving for the highest perfection invariably uncovers the 
inherent imperfection of things themselves.
Ruskin’s and Martin’s emphasis on the hand as 
the instrument of revealing imperfection is ultimately 
contingent. The imperfection - or disturbance - may 
equally mark the time left by the weather or usage, the 
vibration of a string in perfect tension, the passage of a 
shadow, or a movement of a curtain caught in a breeze. 
In all cases, the disturbance would be lost (or, more 
precisely, could be co-opted as a fetish) if the object’s 
form were not explicitly ordered; striving towards perfect 
stillness. The constitutive texture of a material revealed 
through a representationally, non-compromised irreverent 
intervention.
The emphasis on constitutive imperfection suggested 
in Ruskin’s and Martin’s work stands opposed to (today 
increasingly common) fetishization of the stain as an 
index of particularity (identity or memory), and thereby 
reintroducing the presence of universal harmony. As 
Georges Didi-Huberman notes “the effacement of all 
figuration in [a]trace” can itself serve as “the guarantee of a 
link... [I]f there is no figuration it is because contact [with 
transcendetal truth] has [or seems to have] taken place. 
The noniconic, nonmimetic nature of this stain guarantees 
its indexical value. ... The absence of figuration therefore 
serves [or can serve] as proof of existence.”63 Stain (in Didi-
Huberman’s example, a stain on the Shroud of Turin) can 
thereby serve as a support for a reassuring fantasy (the 
truth of Christ’s ressurection). “Indexicality of the visible 
sign” can make it “shine forth as a beacon of symbolic 
law.”64 The stain is thereby deprived of its immediate 
disquiting affective presence (the affective character of the 
stain), and reduced to a (all the more efficent) fetishistic 
support of its opposite: a sense of harmony.
63. Georges Didi-Huberman,  “The Index of 
an Absent Wound (A Monograph on the 
Stain).” October Volume 29. (Summer 
1984): 67-68.
64. Georges Didi-Huberman,  “The Index of 
an Absent Wound,” 69.
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In order to avoid fetishization, in order not to 
compromise its radically non-representational character 
(precisely the character of a stain, as opposed to an image), 
the stain must be registered within a formal order. The 
representation of order prevents the stain from indexically 
reintroducing the sense of order. Its inscription within an 
order deprives the stain of its particularity. If a stain is 
merely rhytmically repeated - namely, representationally 
ordered, in the most minimal sense of the term - it can 
no longer stand for a particular. The shift whereby a 
stain ceases to operate indexically can be illustrated in 
Rotor’s Grindbakken installation. The project consists of 
intentionally registering existing stains - framing them by 
painting their surroundings white - (openly proposing to 
fetishize them) on the walls of concrete bunkers in Ghent, 
Belgium.65 It is precisely only at the point when stains are 
registered within a representational order, such as within 
a perfect square centered between two symmetrical 
openings, that they begin to lose their indexicality (the 
notion that they stand for anything particular) and 
start to be minimally perceived as affective. (The overly 
formal framing is, paradoxically, de-fetishizing. Drawing 
attention to the frame, rather than the thing being 
framed.)
Even at its best, Rotor’s project remains fetishistic. 
Rather than developing an order of staining (an ordered 
mechanism for registering stains), it merely registers the 
already existing; explictly preventing the new. Stains 
appearing on white painted surfaces as a result of use 
remain anthithetical to the project. (In another precise 
definition, a fetishist stain is a stain that cannot itself 
be further stained, as is the case both for the Shroud of 
Turin and for Rotor’s Grindbakken installation. Each 
subsequent staining appears therein as a transgression, 
and can only be accepted through further fetishization.)
65. Andrew Mead. “White Out: Rotor 
installation in Ghent, Belgium.” The 
Architectural Review (17 December 2012) 
http://www.architectural-review.com/
white-out-rotor-installation-in-ghent-
belgium/8639844.article
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The distinction between the egalitarian order (of 
emancipatory practice) and the hierarchical order (of 
corporatist practice) corresponds precisely to its ability 
to allow for the registration of the affect of the stain. 
Whereas within a hierarchical order, the stain subverts the 
notional perfection of  its ‘utopian’ ideal (it appears as a 
reintroduction of the complexity of real-life imperfection), 
and can subsequently either be eliminated or fetishized, 
for an egalitarian order the stain is not a trace evidencing 
its limitation; but a direct  evidence (an embodiment) of a 
refusal to compromise the emancipatory ideal of egaliberté. 
In their emancipatory dimension, stains function not 
as pseudo-critical obstacles preventing the realization 
of utopian content; undermining the consistency of 
represented reality, revealing its flaws, rather, they bear 
witness to the non-synthetic core of radical utopia itself. 
They embody a refusal to reduce the content of the 
formally represented political ideal to a mere organic, 
hierarchic social order. Whereas an organic, corporatist 
order is undermined by the stain, and hence all its effort 
must be invested in eliminating stains, the emancipatory, 
egalitarian order is directly constituted by it. The stain 
stands for the utopian content itself.66 Whereas, in the 
former case, the stain was an obstacle to be removed, in 
the latter, the emergence, or registration thereof is its goal.
The coincidence of the explicit norm of order, 
formal harmony with an immediate, sense of disorder, 
and tension, may be traced in Peter Zumthor’s notion 
of ‘real things.’ For Zumthor, a striving for order and 
harmony of a work, a commitment to “rational and 
objective criteria,”67 “inherent laws of concrete things,”68 
and “the obvious solution so rarely tried,”69 coincides with 
a sense of “vagueness, openness, and indeterminacy.”70 
Zumthor’s notion of the real, the uncovering of which 
he asserts as the aim of his architecture, consequently 
66. “[S]tains are not obstacles that prevent 
our direct access to represented reality, 
they are, on the contrary, ‘more real 
than reality,’ something that undermines 
from within the ontological consistency 
of [what we perceive as] reality...“ 
Slavoj Žižekand John Milbank. The 
Monstrosity of Christ: Paradox or Dialectic? 
(Cambridge, Ma.: MIT Press, 2009): 95.
67. Peter Zumthor, Thinking Architecture, 21.
68. Peter Zumthor, Thinking Architecture, 31.
69. Peter Zumthor, Thinking Architecture, 33.
70. Peter Zumthor, Thinking Architecture, 31.
Opposite Above: Fig. 2.12 Rotor’s 
Grindbakken - Indexical Stains
Opposite Below: Fig. 2.13 Rotor’s 
Gridbakken - Ordered Stain
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does not merely designate the object’s apparent material 
(as opposed to symbolic) properties, nor a metaphysical 
reality accessible through matter. Both the notion of the 
real, as the self-sufficiency of material reality, and the 
notion of the real, as a transcendental order ultimately 
suggest an ontological closure. Both the transcendental 
order, and the mechanistic, material order provide a 
sense of certainty. They do not allow for living, striving, 
developing and desiring. 
While invariably grounded in the material nature of 
objects, the real does not correspond to matter itself, but 
to a property of reality which can be revealed through 
the objects’ material appearance; in Zumthor’s words, an 
inner life of a “tension inside the body.”71 The notion of 
the real, as an inherent tension in matter, is reflected in 
Žižek’s notion of materialism.
The statement ‘‘material reality is all there is’’ can be 
negated in two ways: in the form of ‘‘material reality 
isn’t all there is’’ and ‘‘material reality is non-all.’’ The 
first negation (of a predicate) leads to the standard 
metaphysics: material reality isn’t everything, there 
is another, higher, spiritual reality . . .  If, however, 
we assert a non-predicate and say ‘‘material reality 
is non-all,’’ this merely asserts the non-All of reality 
without implying any exception – paradoxically, one 
should thus claim that ‘‘material reality is non-all,’’ 
not ‘‘material reality is all there is,’’ is the true formula 
of materialism.72
The apparent opposition of crude materialist insistence on 
the self-sufficiency of material reality to the metaphysical 
notion of  “another, higher, spiritual reality” betrays 
their dependence on each other. In order to engage the 
world, as a purely material mechanism - to perceive it 
as self-sufficient, fully constituted - it must already be 
71. Peter Zumthor, Thinking Architecture, 18.
72. Žižek and Milbank, The Monstrosity of 
Christ, 94.
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supplemented with a notion of a higher, spiritual realm. 
Our implicit, officially disavowed, metaphysical belief 
fills the immediate inconsistency of material reality, 
its apparent meaninglessness, allowing it to appear as 
consistent. (Only a spiritual notion of a higher authority 
allows hedonists to devote their lives purely to maximizing 
their pleasure.) 
Architectural appearance (the fact of architecture’s 
material presence) must neither be reduced to a reflection 
of an object’s functional truth (as crudely, mechanistic 
materialism would suggest), nor, to a functional element 
in itself72 (a reflection of some transcendental essence). The 
real is not a dimension hidden behind appearance, rather, 
it  corresponds to the ability of appearance to inscribe 
within itself the gap between (material) appearance and 
(transcendental) essence; namely, the affective dimension 
of appearance (or the immaterial dimension of material) 
through which appearance sustains and structures (affects) 
ostensibly functional processes themselves. Emancipatory 
architectural practice does not consist in a renunciation 
of false appearance in favour of supposedly real function, 
but in re-marking the gap within the appearance itself; 
revealing the real as the non-all within material reality 
itself.
In Zumthor’s work, an example of an ordered stain 
is found in an often overlooked (rarely photographed) 
entry corridor in Zumthor’s baths in Vals. The passageway 
leading the visitor from the reception area to the baths 
proper is along the length of the mountain-side wall 
embedded with five regularly spaced brass pipes 
discharging spring water (hence, Zumthor refers to it as 
the “Fountain Hall”73); producing large ochre and rust 
colored stains on the concrete wall and stone floor. At 
the representational level, the water, seemingly springing 
from the earth, reflects the baths’ origin and foreshadows 
73. Sigrid Hauser and Peter Zumthor. 
Peter Zumthor Therme Vals. (Zurich: 
Scheidegger & Spiess, 2007)
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their function. At the affective level, the causal, irreverent 
acceptance of the stain, sets up our relationship to the 
baths, allowing us to engage them, as analogous to 
wilderness itself; akin to an urban exploration of a post-
industrial ruin. (The Baths can also, to the detriment of 
their emancipatory potential, be read as representative of a 
post-industrial wilderness; as a post-industrial, megalithic 
ruin with a partially collapsed roof and flooded floor.) 
Our enjoyment of the Baths, consequently lies not only in 
their pleasantness, namely an amalgam of their particular 
pleasant features, but also in our affective liberation.
More so than in Zumthor’s own work, the ambition 
of critical-emancipatory architecture to reveal the inner 
tension of order and stillness is clearly embodied in Ai 
Wei Wei’s Grey Brick Galleries in Beijing. The utmost 
formal simplicity, monolithic (or monomaterial) stillness 
and almost militaristic rigour of Ai Wei Wei’s buildings is 
both a naive embodiment of utopian egalitarianism, and 
simultaneously permeated with a sense of disquietude. 
Much like Martin’s paintings, Ai Wei Wei’s architecture 
operates as a structure for recording the weathering of 
brick, the display of discarded sculptures, the registration 
of the daily movement of shadows and the seasonal 
falling of the leaves. The emancipatory-critical dream (or 
ethos) suggested by Ai Wei Wei’s work, is one of ordered, 
proportioned and harmonious structure for recording the 
traces of transcendent disorder and chaos. The sense of 
disquietude embodied therein arises not from an implied 
presence of higher organizing authority, but from an 
absence thereof; a sense of an openness and vagueness 
inherent to things; a sense of the gap.
However faint, the emancipatory dimension of 
both Zumthor’s baths and Ai Wei Wei’s galleries, and 
our genuine enjoyment of them, their ability to accept 
(or reveal) the stain as constitutive, corresponds to our 
Opposite: Fig. 2.14 Baths in Vals - The 
Fountain Hall
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minimal, but undeniable, experience of them as common 
spaces; spaces belonging neither to private nor public, 
spaces unguarded by higher authority where both 
freedom and solidarity is possible. Although both spaces 
are, in their functional reality, not common (the Baths, 
in particular, are privately owned) and, as all visitors are 
aware, the access is restricted, the sense of liberation is 
nevertheless authentic. Namely, rather than obscuring 
their functional reality, the immediate affect offers a point 
of critique. Momentary, affective emancipation, rather 
than allowing us to endure our everyday oppression, 
reveals its, otherwise ignored, oppressive dimension. The 
sense of the common serves as evidence for the possibility 
of the common itself (or more bluntly, the possibility of 
communism).
In a world where we no longer share common culture 
or common experience that characterized pre-modern 
society, the common, the only space not defined through 
exclusion, offers the only possibility of social solidarity. 
The ultimate failure of the Poor Little Rich Man’s home 
as well as our sense of disappointment in architecture 
corresponds not only to its inability to functionally act as 
common space, but, worse yet, to its inability to embody 
the sense of the common and thereby seeming to forbid 
the possibility of the common per se.
The critical, non-fetishistic, dimension of Martin’s, 
Ai Wei Wei’s and Zumthor’s works is best evidenced 
by their critics’ symptomatic attempts to reduce the 
undeniable affective presence of their work to its regional 
or ethnic context. Martin’s paintings of grids have, despite 
her persistent denial, been interpreted as reflecting the 
landscape of New Mexico where they were produced. 
Zumthor’s work has been insistently mystified by positing 
a semi-mystical connection to the geographic locale of 
Critical Universalism
Opposite: Fig. 2.15 Ai Wei Wei - Grey 
Brick Galleries
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the Swiss Alps where he began his practice; caricaturing 
him as a ‘swiss clockmaker’, such that even his projects 
outside of Switzerland are seen as importing a unique 
‘swiss quality’. Ai Wei Wei has been popularized (and 
marketed in the West) as a critic of the Chinese regime, 
and reference to Chinese culture and tradition are eagerly 
sought in his work. (Ruskin, has of course been reduced to 
an advocate of Gothic forms, and ignored as an advocate 
of Gothic spirit.) In all cases, the emphasis placed on 
cultural or regional context (their cultural or regional 
particularization) is not shared by the artists themselves. 
Martin has adamantly refused to read her paintings as 
landscapes.74 Similarly, both Zumthor and Ai Wei Wei 
have revealed that they perceive their cultural context as a 
contingent rather than essential to their work.75
The popular fetishization of authors as figures defined 
by their ethnic substance parallels the discomfort (from 
the perspective of ideology) aroused by the non-fetishistic 
character of their work. Whereas the architecture of 
Koolhaas or Zaha Hadid can be portrayed as genuinely 
global, and celebrated as the vision of a future (that is, 
of course, a continuation of the present), the works of 
Zumthor and Ai Wei Wei can only be appropriated by 
ideology (rendered consumable for established tastes) 
through insistence on their particular ethnic identity, as 
remnants of a disappearing world. (One subversive gesture 
would be to treat Koolhaas and Hadid as ethnic figures; to 
persistently interpret their work through particularities of 
late 20th century Rotterdam and London.) The culturalist-
regionalist particularization is necessary in order to 
incorporate their work within an uncritical ideological 
framework, avoiding their affective quality that resists 
easy fetishization. Attempts to interpret critical works as 
grounded in their particular context, serve to avoid the 
(explosive) universal dimension within them.
74. Agnes Martin herself considers the aim 
of her art to be depiction of “desire” as 
such, rather than a desire for anything 
in particular. Not passion for things, 
but passion per se. See Arne Glimcher 
ed. Agnes Martin: Paintings, Writings, 
Remembrances. (Berlin: Phaidon Press, 
2012)
75. In an interview for the Guardian, 
Zumthor accounts for his location in 
Swiss Alps as ‘accidental’ and not essential 
to his work. Similarly, Ai Wei Wei 
explains references to Chinese culture 
made in his work as a particular strategy 
available to him by the contingent 
condition of working in China, rather 
than the aim of the work. See Peter 
Zumthor. “Serpentine pavillion 2011: ‘I 
hope people relax here.’” The Guardian. 
(30 June 2011)  http://www.guardian.
co.uk/artanddesign/video/2011/jun/30/
serpentine-pavilion-2011-peter-zumthor 
and Ai Wei Wei. Interview. https://www.
youtube.com/watch?v=t-xIszaI0xE
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The culturalist-regionalist interpretation of 
critical works operates in a manner analogous to the 
ornamentation of the Poor Little Rich Man’s home. Much 
like the Poor Little Rich Man’s transformation of his home 
into a work of Art served to avoid the constitutive gap at 
the heart of his self-identity, the fetishization of artists’ 
contingent features serve to obscure the real sense of the 
gap conveyed by their work. A critical-emancipatory 
gesture, emphasizing the universal dimension, must 
thereby be repeated. The liberating capacity of the generic 
(non-identifiable), which Koolhaas rightly identifies,76 
resides purely in its inability to be fetishized as a context 
for the critical. The sense of the gap, unobscured by 
a particular, is possible only within the generic; within 
the non-identifiable, non-places (junkspaces) of the 
global metropolis, in the no-man’s land in-between of 
ethnic imagination; Zumthor or Ai Wei Wei deprived 
of their Swiss-ness, or Chinese-ness. At its most radical, 
the emancipatory shift which opens up the sense of the 
common (and thereby the possibility of the common), can 
only proliferate beyond its particular constraints in the 
space of the common itself.
Interpretation of architecture as a (reflection of a) 
particular (concern); whether, a particular idea that 
it needs to represent, a particular function it needs to 
embody, a particular context it needs to address, or even 
its particularization as an stand-alone object77, is always 
accompanied by its obverse: a universalization of a 
particular - implicit positing of a particular social order as 
universal. Regionalist particularization of Zumthor and Ai 
Wei Wei parallels an implicit universalization of Koolhaas 
and Hadid; and the social order defended through their 
works. Similarly, functionalist particularization (treating 
architecture ‘pragmatically’ as an object serving a 
particular function) universalizes the social framework 
76. Rem Koolhaas and Bruce Mau. SMLXL. 
(New York: Monacelli Press, 1995): 1248.
77. The notion of particularity as a limitation 
to architecture’s emancipatory capacity 
was first pointed out to me by Maria 
Alexandrescu in personal communication.
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out of which particular functional needs arise.
In each case, emancipatory-critique is a critique of 
particularization. It asserts that although, each project 
is grounded in contingent particularities (it does posses, 
particular context, function etc.), there is within a desire 
that is universal; a desire, in Loos’ words for living, 
striving, and developing. The challenge is to not betray it.
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Conclusion: Emancipatory Violence of Geometry
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Architecture always posits itself as an intervention 
against violence. We build homes that shelter us from 
the violence of weather; hospitals sheltering us from the 
violence of disease; and, most literally, we build prisons 
that shelter us from the violence of crime. Architecture 
strives to eliminate eyesores, discomfort and inefficient 
space. At the same time, as Bernard Tschumi notes, 
architecture, in “the intensity of relationship” that it 
establishes “between individuals and ... space,”1 is itself 
inherently violent. Its spaces are disrupted by the presence 
of our bodies, and in turn, they, in their unavoidable 
physical presence, constrain our movements and suppress 
the freedom of our imagination.  
Any relationship between a building and its users is 
one of violence, for any use means the intrusion of 
human body into a given space, the intrusion of one 
order into another... The argument is not a matter 
of style: modern architecture is neither more or less 
violent than classical architecture, or than fascist, so-
cialist, or vernacular versions. Architecture’s violence 
is fundamental and unavoidable, for architecture is 
linked to events in the same way that the guard is 
linked to the prisoner, the police to the criminal, or-
der to chaos.2
Tschumi’s notion of architecture’s inherent violence 
can be read through Slavoj Žižek’s categorization of 
violence. In his book, Violence, Žižek proposes four 
overarching types of violence: subjective, systemic, 
symbolic, and, finally, emancipatory. While architecture 
cannot be non-violent, it can utilize its constitutive 
violence in order to operate in an emancipatory manner.
(1) As subjective violence, Žižek designates any 
violence performed by a particular, identifiable subject. 
It can range from vast humanitarian catastrophes, wars, 
1. Bernard Tschumi, Architecture and 
Disjunction (Cambridge and London: The 
MIT Press, 1994): 122.
2. ibid
Opposite: Fig. 3 Alison and Peter 
Smithson - Hunstanton Secondary 
Modern School (now known as Smithdon 
High School). Brutalism before the 
abandonment of geometry.
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and crimes against which we feel obliged to act, to minor 
discomforts and mundane tribulations. In all cases, 
subjective violence appears as a disruption, an obstacle 
to the smooth functioning of everyday personal ordeals. 
With regard to architecture, subjective violence would 
correspond to the immediate violence of disfunctionality, 
discomfort and ugliness against which architecture 
intervenes, as well as any such discomforts caused by 
architecture’s physical presence.
(2) Systemic violence, for Žižek, refers to everyday, 
matter-of-fact struggles and humiliation experienced by 
the impoverished and the marginalized. 
[T]he “ultra-objective” or systemic violence ... is in-
herent in the social conditions of global capitalism, 
which involve the “automatic” creation of excluded 
and dispensable individuals from the homeless to the 
unemployed.3 
Unlike subjective violence, systemic violence, as its name 
suggests, does not have an identifiable perpetrator, but 
appears as a product of a seemingly neutral, systemic 
framework. Systemic violence always generates (is 
supplemented with) subjective violence. It is the violence 
of a social order out of which architecture arises, whose 
demands it is required to address, and whose institutions 
it ultimately houses.
(3) Embedded in our ostensibly ‘non-violent’ response 
toward subjective violence, Žižek claims, lies symbolic 
violence. Symbolic violence designates the violence of 
our attempt to naturalize systemic violence. Ultimately, 
symbolic violence is grounded in the separation between 
‘normal’ and ‘abnormal’ that is inherent to language, 
hence, its name refers to the violence of symbolization. 
In its architectural manifestation, symbolic violence 
is reflected in a striving towards perfectly functional, 
3. Žižek referencing Etienne Balibar in 
Slavoj Žižek, Violence, 14.
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inoffensive space. Namely, it is embedded in attempts 
to maintain an illusion of systemic non-violence. In, 
Tschumi’s terms, symbolic violence entails a ‘ritualization’ 
of violence.
A ritual implies near frozen relationship between 
action and space. ... When it becomes necessary to 
mediate tension and fix it by custom, then no single 
fragment must escape attention. Nothing strange and 
unexpected must happen. Control must be absolute.4
More broadly, symbolic violence designates the violence 
of any architectural gesture which offers re-assurance in 
the inherent, permanent nature of a (systemically violent) 
social order. The price we pay for symbolic violence is the 
normalization of systemic violence. Its non-violent (or an 
anti-violent) facade, serves to legitimize the violence of 
everyday social reality,
(4) Finally, advising us to abandon the false 
distinction between ‘violence’ and ‘non-violence’ since the 
latter is always a (symbolically violent) attempt to disguise 
(systemic) violence, Žižek advocates emancipatory 
violence; the violence of a disruption of the ‘normal’ 
functioning of the systemic violence. It is the violence 
of our refusal to accept systemic violence; a stubborn 
insistence on non-compromised, universal application of 
a belief in human equality. Whether or not violent in their 
immediate presence, an emancipatory gesture cannot but 
appear as violence from the perspective of social authority. 
Emancipatory violence thus stands directly opposed to 
symbolic violence. It is the violence of a gesture which 
(unlike symbolic violence) cannot be appropriated for 
symbolic violence; a gesture which cannot serve to 
normalize systemic violence.
A potential for emancipatory violence within 
4. Bernard Tschumi, Architecture and 
Disjunction (Cambridge and London: The 
MIT Press, 1994): 126.
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architecture can be traced in Owen Hatherley’s reading 
of Brutalist architecture; the style, as its name suggests, 
devoted to affirming architecture’s violent nature. 
Brutalist raw material presence and its alleged utopian 
aspiration serve, for Hatherley, as a condemnation of (or 
a counterpoint to), what he terms  “pseudomodernism,” 
namely,  architecture adopting “modernist formal 
language,” but replacing its emancipatory politics with 
“vacuous aspirationalism.”5 Unlike pseudomodernism, 
whose eagerness to please - to mitigate the violent effect 
of its own architectural physicality -  “provides a calm, 
ostentatiously friendly face for”6 contemporary erosion of 
democracy,7 Brutalism is, much like Žižek’s emancipatory 
violence, characterized by an unyielding resoluteness, 
which to those confronting it, cannot but appear as 
rudeness.
As Will Self noted in his review of Hatherley’s Militant 
Modernism and A Guide to the New Ruins of Great Britain, 
“[t]he problem for Hatherlay” - and the problem with 
equating Brutalism with emancipatory violence - is that, 
despite his (and other brutalists’) egalitarian rhetoric...
...he cannot quite cope with the deep-seated – and 
philoprogenitive – nature of the masses’ bad taste, 
any more than he can with their unwillingness pas-
sively to consume [unabashedly Brutalist] Liverpool 
tower blocks.8 
The popular dislike of Brutalist heritage should 
be read as evidence of its betrayal of its emancipatory 
potential. (In practice, its brutality serves as a negative 
proof of the need for symbolic violence.) Rather than 
obstructing the normalization of systemic violence - 
and consequently emancipating those affected by it -, 
the violence of Brutalism, while unabashed, appears 
5. Owen Hatherley quoted in Will Self ’s 
review of his work.  Will Self, “It hits 
in the gut.” London Review of Books (8 
March 2012). http://www.lrb.co.uk/v34/
n05/will-self/it-hits-in-the-gut
6. ibid
7. In case of Hatherley’s critique, the 
erosion of democracy sustain by 
pseudomodernism is exemplified by Tony 
Blair’s administration in United Kingdom; 
“the most illiberal administration in the 
history of British democracy.” (ibid)
8. Will Self. “It hits in the gut.” London 
Review of Books. (8 March 2012): 22-24 
http://www.lrb.co.uk/v34/n05/will-self/
it-hits-in-the-gut
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gratuitous (subjective) - violence for its own sake.  
In order to account for its emancipatory failure, 
Žižek’s and Hatherley’s distinction between emancipatory 
Brutalism and pseudomodernist architecture of symbolic 
violence should thus be transposed within Brutalism 
itself. Already, in his seminal essay, “The New Brutalism,” 
Rayner Banham distinguishes formally geometrical 
Brutalism of Smithsons’ Huntstanton Secondary School 
and Louis Kahn’s Yale Art Center from non-geometrical 
Brutalism exemplified by Smithson’s competition entry 
for Sheffield University extension: “the only building-
design which,” according the Banham, “fully matches up 
to the threat and promise of Parallel of Life and Art.”9 
Smithsons’ Sheffield University design strives to create 
a “coherent visual image” not by relying “on Plato and 
the Absolute,” but by “non-formal means, emphasizing 
circulation, identifiable units of habitation, and fully 
validating the presence of human beings as part of the 
total image.”10 “Beauty and geometry - hitherto regarded 
as ultimate properties of the cosmos”, are replaced, in 
shaping architectural form, with “image and topology - 
which, though essentially primitive, have been reached 
only through immense sophistication.”11 
The “modernist formal language” of Hatherley’s 
pseudomodernism itself derives from the Brutalist 
abandonment of geometry.12 In pseudomodernist terms, 
the shift away from geometry is, often characterized as a 
move away from ‘ideas’ to ‘facts’; from abstract to concrete 
concerns, or from a ‘top-down’ Absoluteness to a ‘terrain’ 
of ‘bottom-up phenomena’.13
Field conditions [Stan Allen’s particular variant of 
pseudomodernism] offer a tentative opening in archi-
tecture to address the dynamics of use, behavior of 
9. the title of the 1953 exhibition where, 
according to Banham, Peter Smithson’s 
opening line - “We are not going to 
talk about proportion and symmetry”- 
served as “declaration of war on inherent 
academicism.” Rayner Banham,  “The 
New Brutalism.” The Architectural 
Review. 27 July 2010. <http://www.
architectural-review.com/archive/1955-
december-the-new-brutalism-by-reyner-
banham/8603840.article>
10. ibid
11. Rayner Banham, A Critic Writes: Essays 
by Reyner Banham, (Berkeley and Los 
Angeles: University of California Press, 
1996): 15n. 
12. Geomtery is to be read as an imposition 
of external notions grounded in an 
Absolute, rather than being derived from 
the given.
13. Terminology borrowed from Stan Allen  
“From Object to Field.” in AD Profile 127 
(Architecture after Geometry).
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crowds and the complex geometries of masses in mo-
tion. ... Logistics of context suggests the need to rec-
ognize the limits of architecture’s ability to order the 
city, and at the same time to learn from the complex 
self-regulating orders already present in the city.14
The abandonment of formal geometry should thus be read 
as a shift to the notion of the self-sufficiency of the existing. 
The “bottom-up phenomena”, or “the dynamics of use” 
are seen as self-organizing (generating flows), thereby 
allowing them to serve as a formal principle. (Without its 
self-organization the terrain would be overly chaotic. The 
‘bottom-up phenomena’ would be nonsensical.) Existing 
‘facts’ are sufficient as formal principles (and geometrical 
order is not needed) because they themselves constitute a 
highly complex order (whose intricacies architecture can 
only aspire to). Imposing abstract, ‘top-down’, geometric 
ideas onto the terrain of facts is undesirable, since it would 
disrupt its inherent self-organization.
The notion of bottom-up self-organization is not 
limited to (pseudomodernist) architectural imagination. 
In All Watched Over By Machines of Loving Grace,15 
Adam Curtis locates it at the heart of post-1960s 
popular imagination, linking broadly contemporaneous 
conceptual notions across divergent fields (and seemingly 
divergent political positions): the neo-liberal fantasy of 
self-stabilizing markets (the resurgence of the notion of the 
invisible hand), a techno-utopian belief in technological 
determinism, the notion of ecosystems as stable of natural 
systems sustained through feedback loops (paradoxically, 
threatened by the incursion of a ‘self-stabilizaing’ 
market economy), as well as genetic determinism of 
human behaviour advocated by selfish gene theorists 
(popularized today by Richard Dawkins). The notion of 
self-organization, Curtis claims, is reflected in an Ayn 
14. Stan Allen  “From Object to Field.” in AD 
Profile 127 (Architecture After Geometry): 
30.
15. The title of Curtis’ TV series is derived 
from a poem by Richard Brautigan 
envisioning a world where technology 
has, reassuringly, restored the balance of 
nature.
“I like to think
       (it has to be!)
   of a cybernetic ecology
   where we are free of our labors
   and joined back to nature,
   returned to our mammal
   brothers and sisters,
   and all watched over
   by machines of loving grace.”
Richard Brautigan, “All Watched Over By 
Machines of Loving Grace” (an excerpt). 
http://allpoetry.com/poem/8508991-
All_Watched_Over_By_Machines_Of_
Loving_Grace-by-Richard_Brautigan
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Rand-inspired heroization of an apolitical individual, 
whose pursuit of self-interest at the expense of others 
(virtuous fidelity to one’s selfish gene) was imagined as 
stabilizing the order.
In none of its manifestations, Curtis emphasizes, 
was the notion of self-regulation empirically supported. 
Financial crises illustrated the need for government 
regulation and intervention in stabilizing an inherently 
unstable economy. Scientific models purporting stability 
of natural systems were contradicted by historical data 
showing wild population swings. Nor could selfish-
gene account for seemingly random,  altruistic human 
behaviour. 
The supplanting of abstraction, geometry and the 
Absolute, in favour of the terrain of everyday, practical, and 
site specific concerns misses the dependent relationship of 
the latter on the former. To be human is to inhabit the 
world (to move in it) always with respect to a fantasized 
Absolute. Everyday reality does not exist independently of 
the phantasmatic, rather, the former is always structured 
(held together) with the addition of the latter. 
Consequently, the abandonment of formal geometry 
merely reinforced, and was in turn reinforced by, a fantasy 
of a geometrically ordered universe; a universe of self-
regulating mechanisms and self-sustaining flows. The 
non-geometrical architecture - pursuing, like a Randian 
hero, merely its own ‘dynamics of use’ -  far from avoiding 
an Absolute, posited the given, contingent, systemic 
violence of the existing social order as the Absolute. 
Architectural form should prioritize beauty and 
geometry, not because its abstract concerns are inherently 
more important than the practical issues architecture 
is meant to address (they are not), but, on the contrary, 
because a geometric image (as a formally ordered 
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representation) allows the existing issues to be registered 
in their full (systemic) violence. Geometry can enable us 
to resist (and register our resistance in an architectural 
object) not only against the subjective violence, but also 
against the systemic violence of the everyday. Far from 
validating human presence, as its proponents groundlessly 
claim, non-geometrical appearance reflecting merely 
given conditions, obscures universal human concerns. 
It obscures our intrinsic sense of incompleteness; our 
irreducible desire that is always more than a desire for 
something - a desire for more than the existing. 
The value of formal beauty and harmony (as well as 
the necessity of Plato and the formal Absolute) lies in their 
ability to act as background against which not only reality 
(the rawness of material, the traces of everyday activity) is 
recorded, but also, more importantly, the incompleteness 
thereof. Geometry allows us to register real life including 
its chaotic inconsistency and irreducibility, namely, life 
that is in excess of any notion of self-organization. It is 
only against the formal order than the existing itself can 
be set free.
The failure of Brutalist architecture (evidenced by 
its unpopularity among those whose interest it is meant 
to serve) lies not in the immediate (subjective) violence 
of its material presence, but in a lack of emancipatory 
violence; its inability to stand against (to resist) the 
“flow” of everyday systemic violence. The capacity of 
architecture to resist, to “make life visible (even possible) 
by offering obstacles to unbounded and unstructured 
motion and flow.”16 is unavoidably linked to its formal 
Absoluteness. Motions and flows can be resisted only by 
the incontrovertible, Absolute nature of architecture’s 
material and form.
In historical terms, the abandonment of geometry 
inevitably led to the abandonment of Brutalism itself. 
16. David Leatherbarrow’s remarks in 
relation to Peter Zumthor’s use of the 
word “resistence.” David Leatherbarrow, 
Architecture Oriented Otherwise, 84.
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Devoid of a geometrically ordered frame - devoid of beauty 
and harmony - brutality of raw material presence (no 
longer resisting anything) appeared gratuitous (subjective); 
merely an obstacle to the smooth functioning of everyday 
reality. Consequently, Brutalism was substituted by an 
architecture far more efficient in its symbolic violence - 
allowing us to better digest the violence of the system; 
namely, pseudomodernism. (To architecture devoid of 
emancipatory dreams, non-geometrical form is sufficient.) 
The subsequent failure of Brutalism (and more broadly of 
utopian modernism) lies in its aversion to assuming its 
raw material quality as a propery of geometric order; an 
unwillingness to directly (with enthusiac naiveté) posit 
the non-all (the gap) that causes our disquietude as the 
Absolute. Without geometry Brutalism ceases to be brutal 
enough. It beomes merely a nuisance. Far from being 
its most radical step, the shift to form constituted as a 
product of ‘real’, existing conditions correspondes to an 
abandonment of its utopian dreams.17
Conversely, the persistent popularity of traditional 
academicist aesthetics shouldn’t be dismissed as only a 
reactionary desire  for a return to reassuring tradition. 
Academic formalism is not purely a reflection of social 
conservatism. Its geometry carries an irreducible critical 
potential. The striving for symmetry and harmony also 
suggests a utopian notion against which the present life is 
judged; against which everyday suffering can be registered, 
a radical desire for a qualitatively different future, a critical 
demand that everyday struggle and suffering be registered 
against a “higher” standard. Desire for geometry is not 
(necessarily) a desire from a sense of harmony, but for 
deep disquietude that lies within it.
For Slavoj Žižek, “the duty of philosophy [its social 
role] is not to solve problems, but to define problems.”18 
17. In Lacanian terms this corresponds to the 
difference between the real and the Real.
18. Slavoj Žižek. Zizek! Directed by Astra 
Taylor. (New York: Zeitgeist, 2005).
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Architectural form (its geometry) operates in a similar 
manner. It does not provide answers to social problems. 
It does not suggest (let alone prescribe) particular forms 
of living. Form, primarily, poses a question. It defines a 
problem. 
The failure of historicist neoclassicism - the genre of 
buildings which explicitly posited themselves as a reflection 
of popular taste for formal order - resides (simply) in 
providing the wrong answer to the right question. While 
it registers the radical multiplicity of life (the given appears 
in contrast against it), it seeks to integrate it within its 
hierarchy, or to eliminate it. It misappropriates a radical 
desire embedded in formal order in order to reassure us in 
the inherent nature of social hierarchy. 
Yet, instead of providing better answers, 
pseudomodernism has been merely posing worse 
questions. It reduces its task to facilitating the smooth, 
unobstructed functioning of the social order, devoting 
itself to a problem of maximizing functional efficiency, 
or sensual excitement, namely, attempting to render 
the existing desirable. It is, for this reason, all the more 
oppressive. Pseudomodern abandonment of striving 
towards the Absolute constitutes, to misappropriate 
Banham’s words, an “abdication of architectural 
responsibility.”19 It comprises a retreat from a dream of 
emancipation to a dream of efficient symbolic violence.
The apolitical cynicism permeating contemporary 
architectural practice is neither wise nor critical. On the 
contrary, it reflects architects’ contribution to everyday, 
systemic oppression. While architecture cannot avoid its 
own violence, it can certainly cease contributing to the 
systemic violence of the social order. Architecture can 
resist, but it can only do so through assuming itself as an 
Absolute, through explicitly devoting itself to a utopian 
vision. There is nothing more dangerous and delusional 
19. Banham, “The New Brutalism.”
105
than believing a radically better world is not possible.
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